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California's Fair Employment and




Fair employment laws, which originated in this country in 1941
when President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an executive proclama-
tion prohibiting race discrimination in government defense contracts,'
have increased in scope substantially over the years. The California
Fair Employment Practices Act was passed in 1959,2 and was followed
five years later by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 the major
federal prohibition against employment discrimination. While litiga-
tion under the federal Act was vigorous, for many years California's
Act was largely ignored or ineffectual. Procedural and substantive
amendments to the state Act in the 1970's, however, gave this law new
vigor, and it has now become a powerful and effective tool for eliminat-
ing employment discrimination in California on the basis of race, na-
tional origin, religion, sex, age, physical handicap, medical condition,
and marital status.
Currently, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
* Special Counsel to the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing
(DFEH); former General Counsel of the DFEH. B.A., 1967, University of Pittsburgh; J.D.,
1970, University of Chicago Law School. The views expressed in this Article are personal
and are not intended to reflect the views of the DFEH or the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission.
** Attorney with the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, Employment Law Center.
B.A., 1972, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1980, Golden Gate University
School of Law.
1. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). Promulgated under threat of a
great civil rights march in Washington, D.C., this order prohibited race discrimination in
government and defense contracts.
2. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121 (originally codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West
1971)). The Act has been amended many times. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-1433 (West
Supp. 1983). It is currently entitled the Fair Employment and Housing Act and is codified
at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1972)).
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(FEHA)4 fills significant gaps that have developed under the federal
law. For example, the California law prohibits physical handicap dis-
crimination by most private employers. In contrast, the federal prohi-
bition is generally limited to federal employers, federal grantees, and
some federally funded programs. Thus, for many victims of discrimi-
nation based on physical handicap, only an action under the state law
will be available. 5 Similarly, unlike state provisions, federal law does
not directly cover marital status discrimination 6 nor does it require em-
ployers to grant pregnancy disability leave to every woman disabled by
pregnancy or childbirth.7 Until recently, litigation in the area of wage
discrimination also has been hampered in federal court because of
anomalies of the federal law and a complex analytical framework used
under title VII. In contrast, California has developed its own unique
and straightforward analysis in this area. 8 Finally, the scope of dam-
ages, especially for private litigants, is considerably broader under the
state law than the federal.9
This Article first outlines the history of the California and federal
fair employment laws. It then contrasts the substantive coverage of
these laws, the applicable administrative procedures, and the relief they
make available. The Article next compares federal and state ap-
proaches to proving a discrimination case. Finally, the Article focuses
on three substantive areas that are given markedly different protection
under state and federal laws: comparable worth and compensation dis-
crimination, discrimination based on marital status, and discrimination
based on medical condition and physical handicap. 0 After analyzing
the dimensions of these legal provisions, the Article concludes that Cal-
ifornia law often provides broader substantive protection and greater
procedural access to individuals who have experienced employment
discrimination.
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter referred
to as the Act, the state Act, and the FEHA].
5. See infra notes 243-315 & accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 205-42 & accompanying text.
7. See infra note 36 & accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 93-110 & accompanying text.
9. See infra note 79 & accompanying text.
10. The authors have chosen to focus their discussion on these areas because the state
and federal protections for plaintiffs are significantly different. A thorough discussion of
substantive provisions in areas where the state and federal law do not substantially diverge
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Background and Procedures
History of Fair Employment Laws in California
When the wartime Fair Employment Practices Committee was
disbanded in 1945, its supporters caused fair employment legislation
modeled on the committee's procedures to be introduced in five states:
California, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey.
The statutes passed in every state but California." Fair employment
legislation was also proposed to the voters of California in 1946 as Ini-
tiative Measure No. 11, but was defeated by a proportion of over two to
one. 12 Similar measures were introduced in the legislature in 1947,
1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1957, failing every time. 13 Finally, in 1959 a
bill sponsored by Assemblymen Rumford and Hawkins, co-sponsored
by 52 other assemblymen and supported by Governor Edmund G.
Brown, was passed by both houses and signed into law on April 16,
1959.14
This new law, entitled the Fair Employment Practices Act, estab-
11. 1945 Mass. Acts ch. 117 (currently codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 1-10 (West 1982)); 1945 N.J. Laws ch. 169, § 1 (currently codified at N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 10:5-1 (1976)); 1945 N.Y. Laws ch. 118, §§ 1-3 (currently codified at N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982)); 1945 Pa. Laws 744 (currently codified at 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 951-963 (1964 & Supp. 1982)). See A.B. 11, 31, 97, Cal. Leg., Ist Extraordinary Sess.,
1946 Assembly Final History 99, 103, 126. See also DEP'T OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND
HOUSING, FEHC: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY (1979) (copy on file at the offices of the De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing, 1201 I Street, Sacramento, California) [herein-
after cited as FEHC: TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY]; M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 9-17 (1966).
12. Initiative 11 was defeated by a vote of 1,682,646 to 675,697. See FEHC: TWENTI-
ETH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 11. It is interesting to compare the history of the then Fair
Employment Practices Act with that of the Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963, 1963 Cal.
Stat. ch. 185. The latter law prohibited discrimination on account of race and national ori-
gin in housing. It was overturned by another initiative, Proposition 14, in November 1964.
Proposition 14, however, was later ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (adopting the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1966)). The Rumford Fair Housing Act, codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 35700-35744 (West 1973), was reinstated in 1966, and was joined with the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act in the Governor's Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1980 Stat. ch. 992, to form the
current FEHA.
13. S.B. 16, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1947 Senate Final History 403; A.B. 3027, Cal. Leg.,
Reg. Sess., 1949 Assembly Final History 854; A.B. 3436, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1951 Assem-
bly Final History 937; S.B. 1477, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1951 Senate Final History 403; A.B.
900, 917, 1526, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1953 Assembly Final History 425, 428, 562; A.B. 971,
1868, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1955 Assembly Final History 487, 691; S.B. 1765, Cal. Leg., Reg.
Sess., 1955 Senate Final History 515; A.B. 7, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess., 1957 Assembly Final
History 307.
14. A.B. 91, 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 121, at 1999-2005.
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lished a five member Fair Employment Practices Commission to be
appointed by the Governor' 5 and an administrative agency, the Divi-
sion of Fair Employment Practices, to carry out the policies and dic-
tates of the Commission.' 6 The statute established as the public policy
of California that:
[Tihe practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminat-
ing in the terms of employment for such reasons foments domestic
strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its ca-
pacities for development and advancement, and substantially and
adversely affects the interests of employees, employers, and the pub-
lic in general. 17
The Commission was given the power to investigate, hold hearings and
issue cease and desist orders.' 8 The original act barred employment
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, or
ancestry. '9
There were serious political impediments to similar legislation on
the national level. It was not until 1963 that a comprehensive civil
rights bill, covering accommodations, voting, governmental benefits,
and employment, was introduced. The portion of the bill covering em-
ployment discrimination, title VII, only passed after numerous amend-
ments stripped the new Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) of the power to issue cease and desist orders or go to court.20
The EEOC could only investigate complaints and issue "right-to-sue"
letters for private enforcement of the Act. 21 The federal act did pro-
15. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1414 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983). Originally called the Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission was
renamed in 1980 pursuant to the Governor's Reorg. Plan No. 1,1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 992, which
abolished the Division of Fair Employment Practices and Fair Employment Practices Com-
mission within the Department of Industrial Relations and replaced them with the Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing and the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission, respectively. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12903 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1431 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983).
17. Id. § 1411.
18. 1d § 1426.
19. Id. § 1412.
20. The legislative history of title VII is complex. Originally introduced by Congress-
man Emanual Ceiler on June 20, 1963, H.R. 7152, 88 Cong., 1st Sess., 109 CONG. REC.
11.252 (1963). the statute ran into serious opposition in the Senate where it was subjected to
a 543-hour filibuster by southern Senators before it passed with numerous amendments. For
the full legislative history, see EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965); Berg, Equal
Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 62
(1964); Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964). Title VII was amended in 1972 to allow the com-
mission itself to take certain cases to court. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103. 104-07
(1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)). However, neither the EEOC nor the
hibit discrimination on the basis of sex, a provision not included in the
1959 California law.
Substantive Coverage of the FEHA
In 1970, the first substantive amendment to the then Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act added sex as a prohibited basis for discrimination.
22
Over the years other amendments have added the following as prohib-
ited bases: age over forty (1972),23 physical handicap (1973),24 medical
condition (1975),25 marital status (1976),26 and pregnancy (1978).27
The Act also now prohibits discrimination in employment by em-
ployers,28 labor organizations, 29 employment agencies, 30 and any per-
son who aids or abets another in conduct prohibited by the Act. 31 The
term "employer" includes any person regularly employing five or more
persons or acting as an agent of an employer (directly or indirectly), the
state or any political or civil subdivision thereof,32 and cities.33 The
federal courts have the resources to handle a large percentage of commission charges in this
manner.
22. 1970 Cal. Stat. ch. 1508, § 2, at 2994.
23. In 1961, the California legislature promulgated a prohibition of discrimination in
employment on account of age between 40 and 64. 1961 Cal. Stat. ch. 1623, at 3518 (codified
at CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2072 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983)). Section 2072, enforced by
the Department of Human Resources, was repealed in 1972 when it was transferred to the
FEPA. 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1144, at 211-12 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (West 1971
& Supp. 1983)). Section 1420.1 was amended again in 1977, 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 851, and
1981, 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 146. It is now codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12941-12942 (West
1980 & Supp. 1983).
24. 1973 Cal. Stat. ch. 1189, § 7, at 2502.
25. 1975 Cal. Stat. ch. 431, § 3, at 923. This section, codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 12926(f), 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983), prohibits discrimination for a health impair-
ment related to a diagnosis of cancer for which a person has been rehabilitated or cured.
26. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1195, § 5, at 5460.
27. 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1321, at 4319-22 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12943, 12945
(West 1980 & Supp. 1983)).
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
29. Id. § 12940(b).
30. Id. § 12940(d).
31. Id. § 12940(g) (West Supp. 1983).
32. Id. § 12926(c). Although "the state" is specifically mentioned in the statute, the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission have been enjoined from pursuing any actions against any state agency subject
to the control of the State Personnel Board. State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, No. 28026 (Sacramento Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1980) (order granting preliminary
injunction). Although Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 624 P.2d 1215, 172
Cal. Rptr. 487 (1981), would appear to resolve this issue in favor of the Department of Fair
Employment and Housing and Fair Employment and Housing Commission and although
the appeal in this matter was filed on April 25, 1980, no decision has been rendered by the
court of appeal as of the date of this Article.
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
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Act makes it illegal for any employer to refuse to hire, employ, train, or
discharge a protected person or to discriminate in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 34 The scope of protec-
tion when age and pregnancy are involved, however, is somewhat dif-
ferent: the portion of the act dealing with age does not mention
employee benefits35 and the pregnancy provision omits hiring.36
In contrast, title VII covers employers of fifteen or more persons37
and does not have a separate provision for aiding and abetting. In the
federal system, age is covered not under title VII, but under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,38 which covers only employees
aged forty to seventy, 39 and is administered by the EEOC.40 As was
mentioned above, title VII does not directly provide protection for
those discriminated against on the basis of physical handicap, medical
condition or marital status.
Administrative Procedure Under the FEHA
Because the state and federal civil rights agencies have such differ-
ent histories, structures, and powers, it is not surprising that their ad-
ministrative procedures differ markedly. From the beginning, the
EEOC was denied cease and desist power. Therefore, it never devel-
oped an administrative system of due process hearings. Instead, it in-
vestigates and attempts to conciliate charges of discrimination. Failing
that, a charging party is free to file a charge in federal court which is
litigated de novo.4 1 In contrast, the California Commission has the
power to enjoin illegal acts. Its administrative system includes, in addi-
tion to the power to investigate and conciliate charges, the right to hold
hearings and render decisions that are enforceable in state court.42
In 1978, massive amendments to the then Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act and Fair Housing Act expanded the investigative powers
available under the Acts. Prior to those amendments, the Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission investigated, conciliated, prosecuted, and
34. Id. § 12940(a).
35. Id. § 12941.
36. Id. § 12945. In addition, the pregnancy provision is not applicable to any employer
subject to title VII, except as to section 12945(b)(2), which guarantees all persons disabled by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions the right to leave during their disability.
Id. § 12945(e).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
39. Id. § 631 (Supp. V 1981).
40. Reorg. Plan No. I of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12960-12976 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
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adjudicated charges. The procedure was such that individual Commis-
sion members were often able to interfere with investigations according
to their whims.43 The 1977 amendments44 separated the investigative
and prosecutorial functions, which were given to the Division of Fair
Employment Practices, from the rulemaking and quasi-judicial func-
tions, which were left with the Commission.45 Subsequent amend-
ments46 created the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,
which succeeded to the functions of the Division, and also combined
the housing and employment code sections to create the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act as it presently exists.
Today a person who claims that he or she is aggrieved by an al-
leged unlawful employment practice may file a complaint with the De-
partment of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH or Department). 47
The Department is empowered to conduct an investigation, 48 which
may involve the taking of depositions49 and the issuance of subpoe-
nas,50 interrogatories, 51 and requests for production of documents.5 2
All of these acts may be enforced by the superior court53 and the supe-
rior court order may be challeged by writ of mandate.5 4 If the Depart-
ment determines that a complaint is valid and the unlawful practice
cannot be eliminated by conference, conciliation, or persuasion, it may
issue a written accusation that requires a hearing before the Commis-
sion.5 5 The accusation, the administrative equivalent of a civil com-
plaint, may be issued within one year of the filing of an individual
charge, and within two years of the filing of a class charge.5 6
The Department has a great deal of discretion under this scheme.
43. Tobriner, The Caifornia Fair Employment Practices Commission- The Frustration
of Potential, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 37, 54 (1975).
44. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 1188.
45. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12930 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) (functions of the
Division) with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) (functions of the
Commission).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12903 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
47. Id. § 12960.
48. Id. § 12963.
49. Id. § 12963.3.
50. Id. § 12963.1(c).
51. Id. § 12963.2.
52. Id. § 12963.4.
53. Id. § 12963.5(a)-(c).
54. Id. § 12963.5(d).
55. Id. § 12965.
56. Id. § 12965(a).
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It may determine the scope and extent of the investigation, 57 as well as
whether there is time for a meaningful conciliation conference.5 8 As a
practical matter, however, the Department seeks informal resolution at
every stage of its investigation. 59
In contrast, the EEOC, which historically has not been able to
fully investigate all the charges filed before it, has developed two dis-
tinct investigative techniques. The first is similar to that employed by
the DFEH. The EEOC has the power to subpoena documents and wit-
nesses,60 although normally investigations are conducted with the vol-
untary cooperation of all parties. The EEOC, like the Department,
seeks settlement at all stages but only conducts a formal conciliation
conference after a probable cause "determination."16 1 If it is deter-
mined that there is no probable cause to believe a charge is true, it can
be dismissed. 62 If there is probable cause to believe a charge is true, the
EEOC attempts voluntary compliance through conciliation.63 In both
circumstances the EEOC may issue a right-to-sue letter to the
complainant. 64
The second investigative technique used by the EEOC is the "fact-
finding conference," which is conducted after the parties have complied
with preliminary requests for information. 65 Parties and witnesses may
be subpoenaed for such a conference66 but participation is usually vol-
57. Mahdavi v. Department of Fair Employment Practices, 67 Cal. App. 3d 326, 337.
136 Cal. Rptr. 421, 426 (1977).
58. Motors Ins. Co. v. Department of Fair Employment & Hous., 118 Cal. App. 3d 209,
224, 173 Cal. Rptr. 332, 341 (1981).
59. See CAL. CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS
§ 2.90-2.115 (1981) (describing the DFEH procedure generally) [hereinafter cited as ADVIS-
ING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS].
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8 to -9 (1976).
61. ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS, supra note 59, § 2.80.
62. EEOC Regulations. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1982).
63. Id. § 1601.24. Beginning on June 20, 1968, the EEOC began releasing for publica-
tion certain of the EEOC's probable-cause determination decisions (with the names of par-
ties deleted). These are published in the Bureau of National Affairs' Labor Relations
Reporter and the Commerce Clearing House's Employment Practices Guide. They are in-
formational and not binding on the EEOC or the courts.
64. Id. § 1601.28. This letter gives the charging party the right to file an action under
title VII within 90 days, and is issued in those frequent cases in which the EEOC itself does
not pursue the matter in court. By contrast, California law requires that the Department of
Fair Employment Practices issue a right-to-sue letter to all complainants - whether or not
the investigation is completed - if no accusation has issued within 150 days after the com-
plaint was filed, or sooner if the department decides to close the case. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12965(b) (West 1980). Further, the state right-to-sue authorization gives the complainant
one year to file in court. Id.
65. ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS, supra note 59, § 2.61.
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (1982).
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untary. Settlement is strongly encouraged at these conferences. If no
settlement occurs, the case can be closed or investigation can continue,
although settlement or dismissal is the usual outcome. Once a final
decision is made, the private party is given a right-to-sue letter and can
continue to pursue the matter in federal court.67
Under the FEHA, on the other hand, if the Department finds
probable cause to believe the Act has been violated, and the case is not
settled, an accusation is issued, and the case moves to the jurisdiction of
the Commission which holds hearings pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).68 The accusation initiates the process and states
in ordinary language the acts or omissions charged and the statutes al-
legedly violated. 69 The FEHA requires that hearings take place not
more than ninety days after the issuance of the accusation.70
The actual hearing is conducted according to the rules of the APA,
and presided over by an administrative law judge (ALJ).71 The Com-
mission determines whether the case will be heard by the ALJ alone or
in conjunction with the Commission.72 When the case is heard by the
ALJ alone, he or she must issue a decision within thirty days after the
case is submitted.73 The Commission then has the opportunity to re-
view the AL's decision and adopt it when appropriate within one hun-
dred days or refer it to the ALJ to take additional evidence.74
Alternatively, the Commission may request further argument from the
parties and issue its own decision.75
The Commission's opinion may govern only the case before it or
may be designated as precedential in interpreting and applying the pro-
67. See supra note 64.
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12972 (West 1980) (providing that hearings be held pursuant
to the Administrative Procdure Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11500-11529 (West 1980 & Supp.
1983)). There is no comparable provision under title VII regarding private, state, and local
government employers.
69. Id §§ 11503, 12965(a).
70. Id. § 12968. A party may be granted a continuance upon a showing of good cause.
Id. § 11524. It should be noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings has a strong anti-
continuance policy. See ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS, supra note 59, § 2.103, at 135.
71. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11512(a) (West 1980).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 11517(b).
74. Id. § 11517(d). The Commission may adopt the AL's decision only when it deter-
mines that the evidence supports the findings and the findings support tjhe conclusions.
Topanga Ass'n for Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 515, 522
P.2d 12, 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (1974) (specifically holding that a decision must "set
forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or
order").
75. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11517(c)-(d) (West 1980).
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visions of the Act. 76 Since 1977, when it was given the power to issue
precedential decisions, the Commission has published fifty-nine such
decisions.77
The state Commission's discretion in awarding relief is exceed-
ingly broad. It can issue cease and desist orders of any kind, order
hiring, reinstatement, promotion, and order back pay.78 In addition,
76. Id. § 12935(h) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983). As originally promulgated this section
did not expressly authorize precedent decisions in the area of housing, although the commis-
sion believed it had that authority and issued five such decisions. In 1981, the Act was
amended to authorize precedential decisions as to all provisions of the FEHA. 1981 Cal.
Stat. ch. 625.
77. These decision are published by the Continuing Education of the Bar in Berkeley,
California under the title Fair Employment and Housing Commission Precedential
Decisons, and are available in looseleaf notebooks. Of the 59 precedent decisions issued to
date, three concerned procedural matters only: DFEP v. General Motors Corp., FEHC Dec.
No. 79-A (1979); DFEP v. Motors Ins. Co., FEHC Dec. No. 79-B (1979), a'd, 118 Cal. App.
3d 209, 179 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1981); DFEP v. 20th Century Ins. Co., FEHC Dec. No. 79-C
(1979). These cases confirmed the department's broad powers with regard to investigation
and conciliation. See supra text accompanying note 58. Seven cases involved housing dis-
crimination: DFEH v. Gwen Bar, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 83-18 (1983); DFEH v. Atlantic
North Apartments, FEHC Dec. No. 83-12 (1983); DFEP v. Neugebauer. FEHC Dec. No.
80-14 (1980); DFEH v. Somekh, FEHC Dec. No. 80-15 (1980); DFEH v. Hess, FEHC Dec
No.80-10 (1980), aqfd, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982); DFEH v. Terven,
FEHC Dec. No. 80-09 (1980); DFEP v. Anderson, FEHC Dec. No. 79-05 (1979).
Fifty-one of the decisions involved employment discrimination. Of these, thirteen con-
cerned physical handicap: DFEH v. Sacramento Personnel Dep't, FEHC Dec. No. 83-20
(1983); DFEH v. City of Anaheim Police Dep't, FEHC Dec. No. 82-08 (1982); DFEH v. Bay
Area Rapid Transit Dist., FEHC Dec. No. 80-21 (1980); DFEH v. Bay Area Rapid Transit
Dist., Order on Reconsideration, FEHC Dec. No. 80-21 (1980); DFEP v. Ametek, Pacific
Extrusion Division, FEHC Dec. No. 80-11 (1980); DFEH v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.,
FEHC Dec. No. 80-33 (1980); DFEP v. Interstate Brands Corp., FEHC Dec. No. 78-05
(1979); DFEP v. City of Modesto, FEHC Dec. No. 79-05 (1979), appeal pending; DFEH v. El
Dorado County Sheriffs Dep't, FEHC Dec. No. 79-06 (1979); DFEH v. City of Whittier,
FEHC Dec. No. 79-15 (1979), appeal pending; In re Accusation of Sterling Transit Co..
FEHC Dec. No. 79-04 (1979), aff'd, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981); DFEP
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., FEHC Dec. No. 78-02 (1978), af'd, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d
1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982). Four involved retaliation: DFEH v. City of Vista, FEHC
Dec. No. 83-03 (1983); DFEH v. Northrup Serv. Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 83-11 (1983): DFEH
v. Rayne Water Conditioning, FEHC Dec. No. 82-03 (1982); DFEH v. Rah Indus., FEHC
Dec. No. 80-12 (1980). Two involved age: DFEH v. United Airlines, Inc., FEHC Dec. No.
82-05 (1982); DFEH v. Xerox Corp., FEHC Dec. No. 80-26 (1980). Two involved religion:
DFEH v. District Lodge 120, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, FEHC Dec.
No. 81-07 (1981); DFEH v. Union School Dist., FEHC Dec. No. 80-32 (1980). Two in-
volved marital status: DFEH v. City of Simi Valley, FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 (1983); DFEH v.
Boy Scouts of America, FEHC Dec. No. 81-15 (1981). See infra notes 205-42 & accompany-
ing text. One involved discrimination on account of pregnancy: DFEH v. Travel Express.
FEHC Dec. No. 83-17 (1983). The remaining cases involved race, sex and national origin
discrimination in hiring, promotion, termination and terms and conditions.
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970(a) (West 1980). Section 12970(a) reads as follows:
If the commission finds that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice
under this part, it shall state its findings of fact and determination and shall issue
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the Commission has interpreted the statute to provide that it has the
authority to award compensatory and punitive damages. 79
As was pointed out above, the EEOC has no cease and desist
power or any power to award back pay or any other relief. Also in
contrast to the state Act, title VII is enforced strictly through the federal
courts, and the federal court's authority to award compensatory and
punitive damages under title VII has been strictly limited,80 although
such damages are sometimes awarded under other federal civil rights
statutes.81
Once the state Commission order has issued it may be reviewed by
means of a petition for an administrative writ of mandate.8 2 If an em-
ployer, labor union, or employment agency petitions for a writ, the
Commission decision is reviewed by the superior court under the sub-
and cause to be served on the parties an order requiring such respondent to cease
and desist from such unlawful practice and to take such action, including, but not
limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay, restoration to membership in any respondent labor organization, as, in the
judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this part and including
a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.
79. CAL. ADMtN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7286.9(c) (1982). See DFEH v. Ambylou Enter., Inc.,
FEHC Dec. No. 82-06 (1982). This power has been contested. Recently, the California
Supreme Court held that compensatory and punitive damages could be awarded by the
Superior Court in a private action under the FEHA, but expressly reserved the issue whether
such damages may be awarded by the Commission. Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior
Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 215, 649 P.2d 912, 914, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 272 (1982).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
Cases limiting this language only to back pay awards include Pearson v. Western Elec. Co.,
542 F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th
Cir. 1975).
8 1. The United States Supreme Court has held that "faln individual who establishes a
cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compen-
satory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages." Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Punitive dam-
ages are not usually awarded under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
because that Act itself provides for liquidated damages for willful violations. 29 U.S.C.
§ 616(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Compensatory damages have also been; denied under the
ADEA as contrary to congressional intent. See, e.g., Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590
F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir. 1979); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
82. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
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stantial evidence test: is there substantial evidence in light of the whole
record to support the Commission's findings?8 3 If the petition is filed
by a complainant, the courts have applied the independent judgment
test: is the conclusion of the Commission supported by the weight of
the evidence?84 This more stringent test is justified because the alleged
victim of discrimination has a fundamental and vested interest in em-
ployment opportunities free from unlawful discrimination, while em-
ployers and unions have no fundamental and vested right to operate
free from government regulation.8 5
The FEHA also permits a private right of action. Once the De-
partment has determined that it will not pursue the matter further, or if
it has not issued an accusation within 150 days, it must issue a right-to-
sue letter to the complainant.8 6 The Department will close a complaint
upon written request of the complainant if he or she represents that the
matter will be pursued in court8 7 If an action is filed in superior court
under the FEHA, the plaintiff may seek, in addition to any equitable
relief, compensatory and punitive damages88 and attorneys fees.89
The foregoing analysis may give the impression that the state and
federal systems overlap. Title VII itself, however, provides for mecha-
nisms that avoid this possibility and allow the two systems to comple-
ment each other. At the time title VII was passed many states had fair
83. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 607, 651 P.2d 1151, 1153. 186
Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1982); Northern Inyo Hosp. v. FEPC, 38 Cal. App. 3d 14, 23, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 872, 878 (1974).
84. Kerrigan v. FEPC, 91 Cal. App. 3d 43, 154 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979).
85. Id. at 49-52, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 34-36.
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980).
87. See DEPARTMENT DIRECTIVE 06 (Jan. 18, 1982). Some respondents have asserted
that a private right of action cannot be pursued before 150 days have passed, but this argu-
ment has not been accepted by most courts to which it is addressed. Because the investiga-
tion process described above and in ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS, supra note 59.
takes time, and because the Department, as a matter of sound administrative policy, handles
employment cases on a first-in-first-out basis, it is virtually impossible for an accusation to
issue in an employment case before 150 days have passed. Furthermore, because of the
incredible volume of cases handled by the Department-8,105 in fiscal year 1982-it would
be a waste of resources to investigate a case the Department knows will be pursued in court.
It is. therefore, the policy not to proceed on any case which will be pursued elsewhere. This
decision is clearly within the Department's discretion. See e.g., Motors Ins. Co. v. FEPC.
118 Cal. App. 3d 209, 179 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1981); Mahdavi v. FEPC, 67 Cal. App. 3d 326, 136
Cal. Rptr. 421 (1977). It further accords with a similar procedure under title VII. EEOC
Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1982). In Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior Court. 32
Cal. 3d 211, 218 n.8, 649 P.2d 912, 916 n.8, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 274 n.8 (1982), the California
Supreme Court mentioned this practice but declined to comment on its propriety.
88. See Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 649 P.2d 912. 185
Cal. Rptr. 270 (1982).
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980).
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employment practices commissions and the federal Act provided that
charges could be filed with the EEOC only after deferral to the state
civil rights system. 90 In addition, the federal Act provides that the
EEOC must give substantial weight to the final findings and orders of
the state agency.9' The EEOC has entered worksharing agreements
with state and local civil rights agencies, including California's DFEH.
These agreements allocate the power to investigate and determine
probable cause of claims covered by both title VII and state law to the
agency with which the claim was initially filed.92
The California Commission's Approach to Employment
Discrimination Cases
The Commission's approach to determining whether there is dis-
crimination in employment is more comprehensive and flexible than
the approach enunciated to date by the United States Supreme Court
in its rulings on title VII matters. While the federal system has a rigid
structure of presumptions and shifting burdens of going forward with
evidence, the Commission tends to ignore such formalities and instead
focuses on the evidence as a whole.
Under title VII there are two primary theories used for proving
90. Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or
political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the un-
lawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local
authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceed-
ings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed
under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration
of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law,
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
91. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
92. The state agencies which fit the definition in title VII set forth supra note 90 are
referred to as "706 agencies." The California Department of Fair Employment and Hous-
ing has been designated a 706 agency. See EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1982).
Worksharing agreements have been entered into with most 706 agencies in order to permit
allocation of charges and avoidance of duplication of effort and unnecessary paper work.
The agreement with the DFEH provides, in relevant part, as follows:
I. DFEH waives the 60 day deferral period referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(c) as to charges alleging employment discrimination covered by both the FEHA
and Title VII filed initially with the EEOC.
2. EEOC delegates DFEH to investigate and resolve charges alleging em-
ployment discrimination covered by both the FEHA and title VII filed initially
with DFEH, and agrees to accord substantial weight to the final findings, orders,
and settlements of the DFEH.
1981 Worksharing Agreement Between the California DFEH and the EEOC.
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discrimination. The first, disparate treatment, was defined by the
United States Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States93 as follows:
"Disparate treatment . . . is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treat-
ment. [Citation omitted] Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.
94
Thus, in the federal courts, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory in-
tent to prove a disparate treatment case.
The second theory, disparate impact, is wholly court-developed.
This theory allows a claimant to challenge employment practices that
are facially neutral, such as aptitude tests or height and weight require-
ments. If such a facially neutral criterion falls more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity, it is
illegal under title VII.95 The Supreme Court has clearly established that
intent need not be proved under this theory.96
Analysis of disparate treatment cases under title VII is usually
made with reference to an allocation of proof set forth in a series of
Supreme Court decisions beginning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 97 The cases provide generally that the plaintiffs initial burden is
to show that he or she belonged to a protected group, applied for an
unfilled position, was qualified, was rejected, and that the employer
continued to seek applicants with plaintiffs qualifications. 98 This
93. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
94. Id. at 335-36 n.15.
95. This theory was established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In
that case an employer was requiring a high-school diploma or a minimum score on an intel-
ligence test for blue-collar jobs. These requirements screened out almost all black applicants
and were found to be unrelated to successful job performance.
96. Id. at 432. The Court expressly found that a lack of discriminatory intent was
suggested by the employer's special efforts to help undereducated employees by financing
two-thirds of the cost of tuition for high school training. The Court stated "Congress di-
rected the thrust of [title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation." Id. (emphasis in original).
97. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
98. The Court stated:
The plaintiff must show: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from per-
sons of complainant's qualifications.
Id at 802. The Court noted that this standard is flexible and necessarily varies with different
fact situations. Id. at 802 n.13.
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showing contitutes a prima facie case.99 If the plaintiff succeeds in
proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to
"clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."100 If the defendant meets this bur-
den, the plaintiff, who retains the burden of persuasion throughout,
must show either that "a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or. . . that the employer's proferred explanation is un-
worthy of credence."' 0 '
The Commission adopted the federal disparate impact analysis 0 2
but uses a different approach in disparate treatment cases. The Com-
mission, in DFEH v. Ambylou Enterprises, Inc. ,103 set forth a different
way of stating the disparate treatment theory.
"In order to prove a violation of the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act ... the Department must first prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence (1) that the complainant is within the group
of people for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) that the com-
99. Id. at 802. In a later case, Furuco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the
Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind the elements of a prima facie case set forth
in McDonnell Douglas. The Furnco Court stated:
[W]e know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business
setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his deci-
sion on an impermissible factor such as race.
Id. at 577.
100. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
101. Id. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
This burden allocation was reaffirmed in United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct.
1478 (1983).
102. DFEH v. City and County of San Francisco, FEHC Dec. No. 82-11 (1982). Al-
though the commission adopted the analysis of disparate impact set forth in Griggs v. Duke
Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1970), it has taken an approach to statistical proof different from that
developed under title VII. Several recent federal cases have established the principle that in
discrimination cases, adverse impact can only be proven by statistics showing at least two to
three standard deviations from the expected norm. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14 (1977); Castenada v. Portida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1976).
In DFEH v. City and County of San Francisco, on the other hand, the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission held that the 80% rule may serve to justify an inference that there is a
violation of the Act. FEHC Dec. No. 82-11 at 27-28. That rule, established by the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 167.4D (1982), and adopted by
the FEHC in CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7287.4(a) (1982), is as follows:
A selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5)
(or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while
a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforce-
ment agencies as evidence of adverse impact.
103. FEHC Dec. No. 82-06 (1982).
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plainant suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) that a
causal connection exists between the complainant's protected status
and the adverse action.'1°4
The Commission puts different emphasis on what is needed to prove
"intent" by calling it "causal connection." The Commission has stated
that this causal connection or nexus can be proved by establishing facts
that create an inference of discrimination, as in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,'0 5 or by a showing of actual bias against complainant's
group, or by other competent evidence.106
Actually, in most of the Commission cases, the prima facie or ini-
tial inference of discrimination is made by examining all of the Depart-
ment's evidence. For example, in DFEH v. Hubacher Cadillac/Saab,
Inc. 107 the Commission reiterated that there is no fixed formula for
establishing a prima facie case, and found "an inference that an em-
ployment decision was based on discriminatory criteria under the Act"
through 1) statistical data, 2) statements of hostility regarding the com-
plainant's protected group, and 3) disparate treatment of complainant.
Thus the Commission's position is that McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green sets out but one way of raising an inference of discrimination. 108
If the Department has established a prima facie case, in the sense
that a nexus existed between the complainant's protected status and the
adverse action, the Commission examines the respondent's rebuttal and
any affirmative defenses that the respondent may raise. If the respon-
dent rebuts the prima facie case or if it establishes an affirmative de-
fense, the Department will not prevail. 10 9
Despite the fact that the prima facie case method established in
McDonnell Douglas was "never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic,"' 10 under title VII it has been interpreted as a formalistic
way of proving disparate treatment. The Commission, on the other
hand, by looking at the evidence as a whole to decide whether discrimi-
nation exists, has clearly abandoned it as the primary analytical tool.
104. Id. at 5. See also DFEH v. City of Simi Valley, FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 at 6 (1983);
DFEH v, San Francisco Mun. Ry. (Eskridge), FEHC Dec. No. 82-23 at 8 (1982).
105. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
106. DFEH v. Ambylou Enter., Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 82-06 at 5-6 (1982); DFEH v.
Lucky Stores, FEHC Dec. No. 80-30 (1980) (writ granted on other grounds, appeal
pending).
107. FEHC Dec. No. 81-01 (1981). See also DFEH v. San Mateo, FEHC Dec. No. 82-
16 (1982); DFEH v. Lucky Stores, FEHC Dec. No. 80-30 (1980).
108. See, e.g., DFEH v. Sonoma County, FEHC Dec. No. 80-25 (1980) (Commission
analyzes the case in McDonnell Douglas P. Green terms).
109. DFEH v. Ambylou Enter., Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 82-06 at 5 (1982).
110. Id. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481 (1983): Furnco




The term "comparable worth" is usually understood to cover al-
leged discrimination in compensation where persons of one race or sex
are paid less than other persons similarly situated for jobs which, al-
though not substantially equal, are of "comparable worth" to the em-
ployer. Comparable worth litigation has been extremely controversial
under title VII.II In contrast, such actions have been liberally allowed
by the Commission." 2 Comparable worth litigation has been contro-
versial for several reasons: the economic implications of such ac-
tions; 13 the uncertainty of proof under the theory; 14 and, until the
United States Supreme Court decided County of Washington v. Gun-
ther,"15 the belief by many courts that such cases were not embraced by
title VII.116 Under the FEHA, although the comparable worth concept
111. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 & 168 n.6 (1981).
112. See, e.g., DFEH v. County of Madera, FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 (1983); DFEH v.
Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 (1981).
113. See, e.g., E. LIVERNASH, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES
(1980); Gasaway, Comparable Worth.- A4 Post-Gunther Overview Committee, 69 GEO. L.J.
1123, 1161 (1981).
114. See Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1979); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination and
Job Segregation: The Survival of a Theory, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. I (1981); Nelson, Opton,
& Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 231 (1980); Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But Equal"---Job Segregation
and Pay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. REV. 269; Note, Comparable
Worth, Disparate Impact, and the Market Rate Salary Problems. A LegalAnalysis and Statis-
ticalApplication, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 730 (1983); NOTE, Women, Wages, and Title VI" The
Signficance of County of Washington v. Gunther, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 467 (1982).
115. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). The plaintiffs in Gunther alleged that female guards working
in the female section of the county jail were paid less than male guards working in the male
section. They alleged, inter alia, that part of the pay differential was attributable to inten-
tional sex descrimination. They claimed that the county set the pay scale for female guards
at a level lower than that warranted by the county's own survey of the outside market value
of such jobs. Id. at 163-65. The district court held that a sex-based wage discrimination
claim could not be brought under title VII unless it met the requirements of the Equal Pay
Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)--that the jobs be substantially equal. The district
court therefore refused to take any evidence of the charge of intentional sex discrimination.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), holding that
persons alleging sex discrimination "are not precluded from suing under Title VII to protest
.. . discriminatory compensation practices" merely because their jobs are not equal to
higher paying jobs held by members of the opposite sex. Id. at 891. The Supreme Court
affirmed, 451 U.S. 161, 166 (1981). See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
116. Some courts, including the district court in Gunther, believed that the Bennett
amendment to title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), limited sex-based
wage claims to those covered by the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. See Orr v.
May/July 19831 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
has not been explicitly explored,117 disparate treatment claims can be
proven in a fairly straightforward manner using the concept of nexus.
Furthermore, the Commission is not burdened with the Bennett
Amendment, discussed below, and the problems of interpreting affirm-
ative defenses under the Equal Pay Act. Thus, plaintiffs with compara-
ble worth claims are likely to find a California state court a more
hospitable forum.
Jurisdictional Di.erence Between the FEHA and Title VII
The uncertainty under title VII regarding comparable worth arose
from a specific provision within title VII, known as the Bennett
Amendment, 18 which in turn refers to the Equal Pay Act of 1963.119
While title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, . . . because
of such individual's. . . sex," 120 the Bennett Amendment says that it is
not unlawful under title VII "for any employer to differentiate upon
the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensa-
tion paid . . . if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of
the [Equal Pay Act]."' 12 1
In Gunther, the Supreme Court held that Congress, by passing the
Bennett Amendment, intended only to incorporate the affirmative de-
fenses of the Equal Pay Act.1 22 The Equal Pay Act lists four defenses.
Employers may pay unequal wages for equal jobs if the employer can
prove that the difference is based on: 1) a seniority system; 2) a merit
system; 3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or 4) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex. 123 The Court reasoned that the Amendment bars sex-based dis-
crimination claims under title VII only where the pay differential is
"authorized" by the Equal Pay Act, and the Equal Pay Act in essence
McNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 65 (1975); Ammons v.
Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119-20 (10th Cir. 1971). But see International Union of Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1981); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980):
Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
117. In DFEH v. County of Madera, FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 (1983), the Commission
stated that in a proper case a violation of the Act could be established "even where differ-
ently paid jobs are dissimilar, for example where a point-count job evaluation reveals that
dissimilar jobs should be similarly paid." Id. at 39 n.2.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
121. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
122. 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
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"authorizes" an employer to differentiate in pay only when it meets one
of the four defenses set forth in that Act.124 Thus, the narrow holding
of Gunther is merely that a claim of intentional sex-based wage dis-
crimination may be litigated under title VII. The court expressly re-
served judgment on whether the concept of "comparable worth" is
viable under title VII. 125
The problem with the Bennett Amendment does not arise under
the Fair Employment and Housing Act.' 26 The Act provides simply
that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice. . .(a) For an em-
ployer, because of the . .. sex of any person ... to discriminate
against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment."' 27 Unlike the Bennett Amendment, the FEHA
provides no affirmative defenses for wage discrimination, other than
the bona fide occupational qualification and government security pro-
vision, that apply to virtually all discrimination under the Act.128 Thus
unlike title VII, there is nothing in the California Act limiting its scope.
In the Commission's first wage discrimination case, DFEH v. Napa
Housing Authority,12 9 however, the respondent argued that even
though there was no reference to any other statute in the FEHA, the
case should not be analyzed under the Fair Employment and Housing
Act but under California's Equal Pay Act.' 30 The Commission rejected
this contention, pointing out that the Fair Employment and Housing
124. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171.
125. Id at 166 nn.6-7.
126. See DFEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12, at 13 n.3 (1981).
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983).
128. Id (introductory paragraph). The two affirmative defenses are available to any
employer who is alleged to have discriminated against persons in all protected groups, ex-
cept age over 40. Bona fide occupational qualification is defined in the Commission regula-
tions as follows:
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ). Where an employer or other cov-
ered entity has a practice which on its face excludes an entire group of individuals
on a basis enumerated in the Act (e.g., all women or all individuals with lower
back defects), the employer or other covered entity must prove that the practice is
justified because all or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to
safely and efficiently perform the job in question and because the essence of the
business operation would otherwise be undermined.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7286.7(a) (1982).
129. FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 (1981).
130. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West Supp. 1983). The California Equal Pay Act
provides:
No employer shall pay any individual in the employer's employ at wage rates less
than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a
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Act makes no reference to the California Equal Pay Act and that,
under well established principles of statutory construction, statutes that
concern related subjects, but do not refer to each other, are presumed to
evidence different intents. 13' Therefore, the jurisdictional obstacles of
the affirmative defenses of the federal Equal Pay Act, created by the
Bennett Amendment to title VII, do not exist in an action brought
under the FEHA.
The Prima Facie Case of Compensation Discrimination
Litigation in the area of compensation discrimination is still rela-
tively new under both title VII and the FEHA. However, in cases that
have been decided to date, courts seem to be following the same gen-
eral approach towards proof of a prima facie case as in other litigation
under title VII and the FEHA. When a case brought under title VII
alleges an Equal Pay Act violation 32 (e., the jobs are substantially
equal), the courts follow the burden of proof standard set forth in the
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differ-
ential based on any bona fide factor other than sex.
Id
The Act provides for two independent methods of enforcement. An aggrieved party
can bring his or her charge to the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement for enforce-
ment, id. § 1197.5(c), or bring a private action in state court, id § 1197.5(g). In the latter
case, the claimant need not first exhaust administrative remedies. See Jones v. Tracy School
Dist., 27 Cal. 3d 99, 109, 611 P.2d 441, 446, 165 Cal. Rptr. 100, 105 (1980); Bass v. Great W.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 770, 773, 130 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1976). Cf CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12960 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) (requirement of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies under the FEHA).
131. DFEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12, at 13 (1981). This conclusion
is buttressed by the legislative history of both statutes. The California Equal Pay Act was
passed in 1948. 1949 Cal. Stat. ch. 804, § 1, at 1541. The original language was also set out
in full in CAL. LAB. CODE § 1195.7 (West 1971) fourteen years before the federal Act of
1963, and ten years before the Fair Employment and Housing Act. As originally enacted,
the law prohibited paying females "at wage rates less than the rates paid to male employees
in the same establishment for the same quantity and quality of the same classification of
work" but contained so many exceptions (including an exception for a collective bargaining
contract) as to render the Act virtually useless. A 1957 amendment eliminated some of the
exceptions. 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 2384, § 1, at 4130. Two years later the Fair Employment
Practices Act was passed without any protections for women. At the same time the FEPA
was enacted, it had no logical relationship to the Equal Pay Act. In 1970 discrimination on
account of sex was added to the Fair Employment Practices Act. See supra note 22 & ac-
companying text. Thus, at no time did the legislature indicate in any way that the two
statutes were related or were to be interpreted in tandem. See also Bass v. Great W. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 770, 772, 130 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1976) (holding that California
Labor Code § 1197.5 provides a comprehensive plan for processing and resolving com-
plaints of sex discrimination independent of the FEHA).
132. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Piva v. Xerox
Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1981); Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.
1981); Melanson v. Rantoul, 536 F. Supp. 271 (D.R.I. 1982); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 523
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leading Equal Pay Act case Corning Glass Works v. Brennan:133 it is
plaintiff's initial burden to prove that the employer pays workers of one
sex more than workers of the opposite sex for work that requires simi-
lar skill, effort and responsibility and is performed under similar work-
ing conditions. 34 Under this approach, it is unnecessary for the
plaintiff to prove intent.
The more difficult situation under title VII arises when the plaintiff
alleges that she is discriminated against in compensation, but in com-
parison to an employee whose job is not substantially equal. In these
comparable worth cases the courts analyze the facts under a disparate
treatment theory and often rely on a McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green135 analysis. The clearest example of this is Briggs v. City of
Madison, 136 in which female public health nurses employed by the mu-
nicipality claimed that on account of their sex they were paid less than
the male public health sanitarians employed by the municipality. The
court, after reviewing the preliminary showing required by McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green 137 and noting that the prima facie case standard
is not inflexible, 38 set forth the following elements that plaintiffs alleg-
ing wage discrimination must show to establish a prima facie case:
1) the plaintiffs are members of a protected class;
2) they occupy a sex-segregated classification;
3) they are paid less than
4) a sex-segregated classification occupied by men; and
5) the two sex-segregated classifications involve work that is simi-
lar in skill, effort and responsibility.' 39
This five-part analysis rests on the premise that jobs which entail
similar skill, effort, and responsibility are of comparable value to an
employer and would be compensated comparably but for the em-
ployer's discriminatory treatment.' 40 The burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to come forward with non-discriminatory reasons for the
F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Walter v.
KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981).
133. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
134. Id at 195.
135. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
136. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
137. See supra notes 98-99 & accompanying text.
138. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. at 443 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)). See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 575 (1978).
139. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. at 445.
140. Id
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challenged pay disparity.' 4 1 A similar approach was discussed in
Heagney v. University of Washington' 42 where the court stated that evi-
dence of a statistical difference in the salaries between men and women
and a study showing the jobs to be equal as to skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, might constitute a prima facie case under title VII. 43
Other title VII cases have been decided on the basis of disparate
treatment with regard to the salary-setting mechanism itself rather than
the comparison of the jobs. For example, in Wilkins v. University of
Houston,144 an analysis of the implementation of a pay plan showed
that men were paid more than the maximum allowed by the plan, while
women were paid less than the minimum.1 45 In Boyd v. Madison
County Mutual Insurance Co. ,146 a prima facie case was established by
evidence showing that all the female employees were eligible for bo-
nuses while the male employees were not.147 In Roesel v. Joliet
Wrought Washer Co. ,148 discrimination was found when, although all
female managers had lower salaries than all male managers, one was
given a $2,000 pay raise after investigators from the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance challenged the salary system. Because the plain-
tiff's job was substantially equal to the female who received the pay
raise, the court inferred that plaintiff's lower salary was due to her
sex. 149
The Fair Employment and Housing Commission has decided two
compensation cases to date, and in both it looked for the nexus between
the protected status of the complainant and the adverse action com-
plained of, and used all the available evidence to find the connec-
tion.150 The facts of the Commission's first case, DFEH v. Napa
Housing Authority,' 5' are complex. The respondent Housing Authority
was responsible for administering various and changing HUD pro-
grams that provided low cost housing for eligible persons. When the
Housing Authority's first and only two employees were hired, com-
141. Id. at 446.
142. 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
143. Id at 1166. See also Connecticut State Employees Ass'n v. Connecticut, 31 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,528 (D. Conn. 1983); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. Washington, No. C82-465T (W.D. Wash. Sept. 13, 1983).
144. 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 34 (1982).
145. Id. at 406-07.
146. 654 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982).
147. Id at 1178.
148. 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979).
149. Id at 186.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 102-10 for discussion of the nexus standard.
151. FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 (1981).
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plainant Sebia, the female, was classified as a clerk-typist and Morris-
sey, the male, as a Management Assistant. From the beginning of their
employment, their actual duties differed from those suggested by their
job descriptions. 15 2 Their jobs continued to change over time, so that
by 1976, Sebia was working as the assistant director of the program-
negotiating contracts, determining eligibility of applicants, filling in
HUD reports and generally running the operation. Morrissey, on the
other hand, was performing the out-of-office duties such as checking
housing, contacting landlords, and resolving disputes. Despite Sebia's
increased responsibilities, the respondent refused to promote her or
give her pay raises commensurate with the managerial nature of her
job, and relegated her to the clerical pay range. Morrissey continually
received substantial promotions and pay raises. 153 This disparate treat-
ment was the subject of the complaint.
The Commission began its analysis of this fact situation by deter-
mining that Sebia had suffered an adverse employment decision in that
her wages were depressed by virtue of her improper classification as a
secretary and because she was consistently denied promotions and job
descriptions failed to accurately reflect her actual duties. It determined
that Sebia's actual duties bore little resemblance to secretarial work,
noting that a full-time clerk-typist had been hired to assist Sebia, and
that respondent's refusal to upgrade Sebia's classification was
unjustified.' 54
Having determined that complainant suffered an adverse employ-
ment decision, the Commission examined whether a causal connection
existed between complainant's sex and the adverse decision. Here the
Commission looked at several factors. The heart of its decision was the
disparate treatment Morrissey received in comparison to Sebia: his job
description was altered in 1970 and 1973 to reflect his actual duties
while hers was not. Her job continued to be classified as clerical de-
spite the fact that her work was manifestly of a managerial and profes-
sional nature, while his was correctly classified as professional. 155 In
1976, after repeatedly asking for reclassification, she was given the title
"Occupancy Specialist." The job description for this title was identical
to Morrissey's initial Management Assistant job description, yet his sal-
ary was never pegged to the clerical level.
The Commission seemed particularly bothered by the stereotypi-
152. Id at 2-3.
153. Id. at 3-8.
154. Id at 15.
155. Id at 17.
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cal notions of woman's work that it found infected all aspects of the
respondent's decision-making. Napa's personnel director, for example,
testified that Sebia's extensive managerial and decision-making duties
were consistent with the secretarial functions of screening phone calls,
giving information, interpreting departmental policy and regulations
and general office management-all of which were secretarial duties.
The Commission noted: "According to this selective and overbroad
reading of the secretary job description . . . all the City's white collar
workers might well be classified as secretaries."' 156 It went on to state
that "[a] vague job description, especially in a field traditionally identi-
fied as women's work, may well facilitate reliance on irrelevant sexual
stereotypes in assigning job titles to women."' 157 Furthermore, the
Commission relied on reputation and opinion testimony with respect to
the City Manager's discriminatory attitude toward female employees.
Evidence was submitted to show that he viewed women as secretaries
and exercised considerable influence on city personnel decisions. The
Commission also credited the Department's statistical evidence that
women were underrepresented in the professional ranks in Napa and
overrepresented in clerical positions. 58 Thus the Commission found
the Department had established its prima facie case.
The Commission's second compensation case, DFEH v. County of
Madera,159 was factually similar to County of Washington v. Gunther.160
It involved charges that female Matron-Dispatchers who, among other
things, guarded female prisoners, were paid less than male Deputy
Sheriffs who guarded male prisoners. As in DFEH v. Napa Housing
Authority, 161 the Commission found relevant the history of the Matron-
Dispatcher job; it held that although the job responsibilities of both
males and females had evolved over time, the women's salaries were
consistently set lower no matter how similar the female duties were to
those of the males. 162
The Commission's finding that there was a nexus between the
complainants' salaries and their sex, ie., that respondent had intention-
156. Id. at 16.
157. Id
158. The Commission had previously held that statistics are relevant to show nexus and
otherwise buttress the Department's prima facie case and proof of liability. See, e.g.. DFEH
v. Hubacher Cadillac/Saab, Inc., FEHC Dec. No. 81-01, at 7 (1981); DFEH v. Lucky Stores.
FEHC Dec. No. 80-30 (1980).
159. FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 (1983).
160. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). See facts discussed supra note 115.
161. DFEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 (1981).
162. DFEH v. County of Madera, FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 at 35-36.
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ally discriminated against women in setting their wages lower than
men, was "inferred from the fact that it regularly and purposefully
treated women differently and generally less favorably than men."
16 3
An important finding of fact was that respondent had maintained sex-
segregated job classifications. '4 The Matron-Dispatcher job was re-
served for women. The comparable male job, Deputy Sheriff, had been
exclusively male until one female was hired in 1979.165 That job had,
until 1979, a height and weight requirement that was found to discrimi-
nate against women and was not related to a business purpose. 66 Wo-
men were also expressly excluded from participating in the Sheriffs
reserves, a volunteer group that provided a unique opportunity for job-
qualifying experience. 167
Other examples of disparate treatment caused the Commission to
find intentional discrimination in compensation. Although the women
complainants were sworn, uniformed, armed, and identified as Deputy
Sheriffs, they were classified and compensated as Matron-Dispatch-
ers.' 68 They were provided a lesser uniform allowance for essentially
identical uniforms. 69 The men received training paid for by the re-
spondent while the complainants received little or no training. 70
Finally, the Commission considered other evidence of discrimina-
tory attitudes towards women. These included the respondent's failure
to follow any recommendations of the State Personnel Board beneficial
to complainants while implementing a whole series of upgrades for
male employees. 17' This evidence, combined with a showing that the
respondent's compensation practices treated complainants differently
than male Deputy Sheriffs with similar duties, 72 combined to satisfy
the Commission that respondent had discriminated on the basis sex.173
163. Id. at 38.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 34.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 38.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 35.
171. Id. at 37.
172. See discussion of compensation defenses supra notes 199-204 & accompanying text.
173. Id. at 38. In DFEH v. Napa HousingAuthority, after considering all of the Depart-
ment's evidence, the Commission found the Department had established a "prima facie
case." FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 at 13-19 (1981). In contrast, in evaluating the Department's
evidence in County of Madera the Commission found "sex discrimination," ie., the entire
Department case. FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 at 38. InNapa Housing Authority, the Commission
went on to look at the respondent's "defenses." In County ofMadera, the Commission ex-
amined the "affirmative defenses." The authors believe this is further indication of the
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Defenses in Compensation Litigation
The case law regarding defenses in compensation litigation is even
less developed under title VII than the case law regarding the prima
facie case. Again, the approach differs depending whether the case is
an Equal Pay Act-type of title VII case or one dealing with different
jobs. In the Equal Pay Act-type of title VII cases the defenses are the
same as under the Equal Pay Act. 174 The defendant may show that the
jobs are not substantially equal, 75 or may prove as an affirmative de-
fense 176 that the unequal pay is authorized by seniority, merit, quality
or quantity of production, or a factor other than sex.' 77 The latter ele-
ment is most often litigated. Typical defenses are that 1) the higher
paid person is in a special training program justifying a higher wage to
workers of one sex;' 78 2) the higher paid person has desirable charac-
teristics for hire, such as more education or experience; 79 and 3) the
difference in pay is based on different value in the labor market. 80
However, it has been held that a market value rate justification, when
the market rate is itself a reflection of the historical discrimination
against women, will not be considered a sufficient defense under the
Equal Pay Act.' 8 '
In a title VII case without an Equal Pay Act allegation, on the
other hand, the standard is much less certain. The Supreme Court in
Gunther 182 held that the first three Equal Pay Act defenses apply to title
VII cases, and indeed are worded similarly to defense language in title
Commission's abandonment of the title VII notion of prima facie case embodied in McDon-
nell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra notes 102-110 & accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 120-22 & accompanying text.
175. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974); Hodgson v. Brookha-
ven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719. 725 (5th Cir. 1970) (jobs not entailing equal effort are not
substantially equal); Shultz v. Wheaten Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. dented.
398 U.S. 905 (1970) (Congress intended a standard of substantial, not literal, equality under
the Equal Pay Act).
176. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161. 167 (1981): Coming Glass Works
v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
178. Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 653 (5th Cir. 1969).
179. Herman v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo.
1977); Bullock v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 424, 430 (M.D. La. 1977).
180. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 204 (1974).
181. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978): Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th
Cir. 1974): Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970); Di Salvo
v. Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City, 416 F. Supp. 844, 853 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
affid as modifled, 568 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1978); Hodgson v. Maison Miramom, Inc.. 344
F. Supp. 843, 849 (E.D. La. 1972).
182. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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VII itself. 83 The Court stated that the fourth defense-a factor other
than sex-is also incorporated into title VII, but gave no opinion on
how it would work. 84 Other cases decided under title VII describe the
defendant's burden as that of showing that the disparity in pay is based
on a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. In Briggs v. City of
Madison,185 for example, the defendant introduced evidence that there
were legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for the proven pay dispar-
ity: the market rate was higher for male sanitarians than for female
nurses, the sanitarian jobs were more difficult to fill, making the higher
salaries necessary to attract applicants, and much of the pay differential
was accounted for by an independent salary survey conducted for the
defendant that recommended the differential. 86 Whether these non-
discriminatory reasons would support the fourth Equal Pay Act de-
fense and who has the burden of proof are open questions. In cases
brought under the FEHA, after the Commission finds that the Depart-
ment has proven its prima facie case' 8 7 it normally goes on to examine
all the respondent's defenses. In DFEH v. Napa Housing Authority,18 8
the Commission's first compensation case, most of the defenses raised
were of the type traditionally raised under the federal Equal Pay Act.
The first defense was that Morrissey's initial salary was higher
than Sebia's because of his college education and managerial experi-
ence. The Commission found that the respondent failed to prove that
Morrissey's salary was in fact based on his education and experience
and that the possession of such credentials was relevant to the job. 89
Respondent also argued that Morrissey's higher salary reflected
the prevailing community wage and was necessary to attract highly
qualified applicants. The Commission found that the respondent had
183. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) ("it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation...
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production. . .") with first three defenses in the Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 206(d)(1)(i)-(iii) (1976) (a seniority system, a merit system, and a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production).
184. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170-71.
185. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
186. Id at 446-47. See also Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Ins. Co., 653 F.2d 1173,
1178 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1146 (1982) (bonuses available to female clericals
only as an incentive to rectify absentee problem).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 150-58.
188. FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 (1981).
189. Id. (citing Herman v. Roosevelt Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 432 F.Supp. 843 (E.D.
Mo. 1977) (a federal Equal Pay Act case), and Bullock v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 424
(M.D. La. 1977) (a combination Equal Pay Act and title VII case)).
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failed to prove any facts to support this theory.'90 The Commission
further held that if the respondent meant to argue that a woman's
worth in the market place was less than a man's this argument would
fail as well because "[this is the very sort of sex discrimination which
our Act is designed to obliterate."'91 For this proposition the Commis-
sion referred to the United States Supreme Court holding in Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan,192 a federal Equal Pay Act case in which the
Court held that the relative ease of recruiting women to low paying
jobs did not constitute a factor other than sex and thus was not an
affirmative defense under that Act.' 93
While it is fairly well established that a market rate which reflects
historic discrimination against women will not be considered a defense
under the Equal Pay Act,' 94 that proposition has not been firmly estab-
lished in comparable worth cases litigated solely under title VII. 195 Al-
though it has been forcefully argued that the Corning Glass principle
could apply to wage discrimination claims under title VI1,196 at least
one district court has held that it does not. 197 However that decision is
resolved in the federal courts, the Commission has held that market
rates will not constitute a defense to wage discrimination under the
FEHA where such rates reflect women's historically weak position in
the labor market.
The Commission in DFEH v. Napa Housing Authority also re-
jected the respondent's contention that Morrissey was entitled to more
190. DFEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 at 19. In contrast, in a recent
federal comparable worth case, Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis.
1982), after plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of wage discrimination against female
nurses, the defendant produced evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
disparity: ie., there was a shortage of candidates for the traditionally male sanitarian job
and the higher salary was necessary to attract applicants. The court found that the plaintiffs
had failed to show this reason was pretextual, but that they might have done so by showing
the size of the labor pools for the male and female jobs, the number of vacancies or the
average time that jobs went unfilled. Id. at 446-48.
191. DFEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 at 21.
192. 417 U.S. 188 (1973).
193. Id at 205.
194. See cases cited supra note 181.
195. In at least one case litigated under both the Equal Pay Act and title VII, Bullock v.
Pizza Hut, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 424 (M.D. La. 1977), the court held that the market rate did not
constitute a defense. Id. at 430 (following Corning Glass). But in Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co..
691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982), the court in discussing the "factor other than sex" defense
allowed the defendant to attempt to prove on remand that the use of the market rate was
justified by a business reason and was not a pretext for discrimination. 1d at 876-77. This
standard seems half-way between the Equal Pay Act and title VII.
196. Newman & Vonhof, supra note 114, at 314.
197. Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 447 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
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pay because his job required greater skills, because the evidence did
not support the contention that he had or used special skills. That
Morrissey might have worked independently did not justify the pay
disparity, since Sebia was also largely unsupervised. The Commission
ultimately held that the respondent had failed to rebut the department's
prima facie case and that the preponderance of evidence showed that
respondent discriminated against complainant in compensation, terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment because of her sex. 198
The Commission approached the defenses in a different way in the
County of Madera case. Rather than discussing the respondent's de-
fenses separately as it did in Napa Housing Authority, the Commission
examined them in its analysis of the Department's case in chief. The
respondent's principal defense was that the women were paid less than
the men because their job duties were substantially different; in particu-
lar, the Matron-Dispatchers were responsible for fewer inmates. The
Commission found, however, that this was because the respondent as-
signed the Matron-Dispatcher only to female inmates, and that this as-
signment was based on sex. 199 There was no showing, moreover, that
the women were paid according to the amount of jail work they did.
The evidence indicated the women "worked harder than the jail-Depu-
ties, who had only jail work as their primary responsibility," while the
women had their dispatch work too.2°° The Commission noted that it
was not holding that an employer could not classify and compensate its
employees to reflect the duties assigned, "so long as sex (or another
prohibited basis) is not a factor in the classification. '20 1
The respondent also denied creating all male and all female job
categories. The defense that the decision to create the Matron-Dis-
patcher class was not based on sex was rejected because the title of the
position was gender-linked, the position was created as part of a deci-
sion to take the dispatcher duties away from the male deputies and
assign them to the female matrons, and was filled solely by women.202
Respondent denied discriminating against women in their admission to
the male Deputy Sheriff class. Respondent asserted that the height and
weight requirement did not affect these complainants because the re-
quirements could have been waived. The Commission rejected this ar-
gument, holding that such requirements were used to inform potential
198. DPEH v. Napa Hous. Auth., FEHC Dec. No. 81-12 at 23 (1981).
199. FEHC Dec. No. 83-22 at 37 (1983).
200. Id. at 37.
201. Id. at 39.
202. Id. at 33.
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job applicants of job requirements and had discouraged these com-
plainants from applying. 20 3 The Commission finally noted that while a
bona fide occupational qualification affirmative defense was available
to respondent, no such defense had been proved.20 4
Marital Status
The Fair Employment and Housing Act expressly prohibits dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of marital status, whereas title
VII does not. Title VII covers marital status indirectly, as a species of
sex discrimination where certain marital status policies have an adverse
impact on women or are intended to discriminate. However, many
forms of discrimination are not covered at all under title VII and for
those that are, the standard of proof-involving an adverse impact ele-
ment not required under the state Act-is more difficult to meet. Plain-
tiffs are able to remedy marital status discrimination more directly
under the FEHA.
The provision barring discrimination on the basis of marital status
was added to the then Fair Employment Practices Act and the Rum-
ford Fair Housing Act in 1976.205 As part of the 1976 amendments the
legislature specifically found that discrimination on the basis of marital
status is against public policy 20 6 and that the right to seek, obtain, and
hold employment without discrimination because of marital status is a
civil right.20 7
Marital status discrimination is not covered directly under title VII
but it has been found illegal in certain situations when rules concerning
marital status affect women and not men. A typical case is Sprogis v.
United Airlines ,208 in which the defendant had a policy that female
flight attendants could not be married but male flight attendants could.
Because this rule impacted adversely on women, it was held to be un-
lawful sex discrimination. 20 9 In Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. ,2I0 a
prima facie case of sex discrimination was established where a rule
203. Id. at 34.
204. Id. at 38-39.
205. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1195, § 1, at 5459.
206. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980).
207. Id § 12921.
208. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
209. Id at 1197-98. The court relied in part on the EEOC Guidelines on sex discrimina-
tion which provide:
The Commission had determined that an employer's rule which forbids or restricts
the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married men is
a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It
does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but
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prohibiting employment of spouses affected seventy-one women and
only three men.2 But in cases where the airline employed no male
flight attendants and had a no-marriage rule, it was held lawful because
there was no disparate impact.212 Under title VII, anti-marriage and
no-spouse rules that do not have an adverse impact on one sex are gen-
erally not held unlawful.213
Under the FEHA, any rule requiring employees to be either mar-
ried or single is illegal regardless of its impact on only one sex. The
Commission has stated that marital status discrimination can be estab-
lished by showing that an applicant or employee has been denied em-
ployment benefit by reason of:
1) the fact that the applicant or employee is not married;
2) an applicant's or employee's "single" or "married" status, or
3) the employment or lack of employment of an applicant's or em-
ployee's spouse.214
Thus, the mere consideration of marital status of an applicant or em-
ployee is prohibited by the FEHA. Three precedential decisions on the
subject of marital status have focused on the definition of marital sta-
tus. One has addressed the employer's affirmative defenses.
The first, DFEH v. Hess & Hess,2 5 a housing case,2 16 was fairly
straightforward. The respondents had accepted complainants' applica-
tion and deposit without inquiring as to their marital status. When the
landlords discovered that complainants were not married, they refused
to rent them the unit. This was held to be unlawful marital status
only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the
rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1982).
210. 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977).
211. Id at 498.
212. Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 844 (1978). The law in this area may be changing, however. In Gordon v. Continental
Airlines, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 235 (9th Cir. 1982), the court ruled that maximum weight
requirements applied to an all-female flight attendant category were illegal under title VII.
The court held that plaintiffs did not need to prove men were performing similar work.
Intent would be inferred from the segregation of women in this position. But see Costa v.
Markey, 677 F.2d 158, 161-62 (1st Cir. 1982) (upholding minimum height requirement as it
applied to an all-female applicant pool).
213. Tuck v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Smith v. Mu-
tual Benefits Life Ins. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 252, 253 (D.N.J. 1976).
214. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7292.2 (1982).
215. FEHC Dec. No. 80-10 (1980), aff'd, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712
(1982).
216." In DFEH v. Boy Scouts of Am., FEHC Dec. No. 81-15 (1981), the Commission
said that "construction of the employment discrimination provisions with the housing dis-
crimination provisions of the Act is instructive." Id. at 9.
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discrimination. 21 7
Similarly, in DFEH v. Neugebauer,21 8 the Commission found mar-
ital status discrimination where the respondent expressed a preference
for a married couple over the complainant, who was a widow. In that
case, the respondent contended that the decision not to rent was based
only in part on the fact that the complainant was not married. She
allegedly was denied the apartment in question in part because the
landlord feared complainant would use her power tools in the apart-
ment and disrupt the other tenants. The Commission held that a pro-
hibited basis like marital status (or race) cannot be any part of the
reason a prospective tenant is denied housing.219 It thus found unlaw-
ful discrimination. 220
This holding was reiterated in the employment setting in DFEH v.
City of Simi Valley 22 1 in which an employer refused to hire the com-
plainant as a mechanic in the Department of Public Works because his
wife was employed as a clerk in the same Department. The Commis-
sion found that the employer had discriminated on the basis of marital
status. The Commission held that "the evidence need not demonstrate
that complainant's marital status was the sole or even the dominant
cause of his adverse treatment; discrimination is established if com-
plainant's marital status was at least one of the factors influencing re-
217. The respondent's defense, which was rejected by the Commission, was that, al-
though they allowed married couples to aggregate their income for the purposes of
determining financial eligibility, they did not allow unmarried couples to do so because they
were not legally liable for each other's debts. This defense, which is frequently raised in
housing discrimination cases, was also ruled to lack merit by the Court of Appeal which
affirmed the Commission's decision. Hess & Hess v. FEHC, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 712 (1982). The appellate court referred to a provision of the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976), which prohibits creditors from discriminating against
applicants on the basis of marital status, and a case decided under the federal Act, Markham
v. Colonial Mort. Serv. Co. Assoc., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979). That case held that it was
unlawful for a creditor to treat applicants differently-that is refuse to aggregate their in-
comes-solely because of their marital status. The Hess court pointed out, as did the Com-
mission, that the landlord could require each tenant to be personally liable for the amount of
the rent and thus have a contract action against each of them. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 236, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 715.
218. FEHC Dec. No. 80-14 (1980).
219. Id. at 6. The Commission cited Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344,
349-50 (7th Cir. 1970) (decided under 42 U.S.C. § 1982) and United States v. Pelzer Realty
Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (decided under the
Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604).
220. The Commission has also held, in the employment context, that a showing that a
protected basis was a factor contributing to the employment decisions can be enough to
establish a prima facie case. DFEH v. Lucky Stores, FEHC Dec. No. 80-30 at 17 (1980).
221. FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 (1983).
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spondent's actions. ' 222 In City of Simi Valley, the employer had a "no-
spouse" rule that was the sole cause of complainant's rejection. This
was held to constitute unlawful marital status discrimination.
In DFEH v. Boy Scouts of America 223 the Commission found un-
lawful marital status discrimination in an employment context when
the respondent refused to hire complainant because he was living with
a woman not his wife. The Boy Scouts argued that their refusal to hire
was based on the applicant's unmarried cohabitation and not on his
marital status. The Commission disagreed, citing first its regulations
defining marital status as "[a]n individual's state of marriage, dissolu-
tion, separation, widowhood, annulment, or other marital state. ,224 It
noted that the respondent had virtually conceded that had complainant
been married to the woman he lived with, he would have been consid-
ered for the job for which he applied. Second, the Commission cited
two cases, Atkinson v. Kern County Housing Authority 225 and DFEH v.
Hess & Hess,2 26 holding that in the housing context, refusal to rent on
the basis of marital status was established where the refusal was based
on unmarried cohabitation. The Commission held that the case law in
the area of housing discrimination applied fully to the employment sec-
tions of the Act.227
Read together, the FEHA, regulations, and precedential decisions
described above indicate that the definition of marital status discrimi-
nation is very broad under the Act. It includes the mere status of being
married or unmarried, living arrangements including cohabitation or
living with relatives other than a spouse, and nepotism rules as they
affect spouses. Other states that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
marital status have established narrower definitions. For example, in
McFadden v. Plma Country Club,228 the Washington state court held
that a statute banning marital status discrimination in real estate trans-
222. Id. at 6. The Commission cited the following precedential decisions: DFEH v.
Northrup Serv., FEHC Dec. No. 83-11 at 9 (1983) (age); DFEH v. Hubacher Cadillac/Saab,
Inc., FEHC Dec. No 81-01 at 15 (1981) (sex); DFEH v. Lucky Stores, FEHC Dec. No. 80-30
at 17 (1980) (sex).
223. FEHC Dec. No. 81-15 (1981).
224. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7292.1(a) (1982).
225. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976). This case involved the refusal of a
public housing authority to rent to an unmarried woman and her boyfriend. The action was
brought under a HUD ruling that marital status could not be the sole basis for excluding an
applicant, but the court referred to the marital status provision of the FEHA,
226. FEHC Dec. No. 80-10 (1980). See supra notes 192-94 & accompanying text (dis-
cussion of Hess).
227. DFEH v. Boy Scouts of Am., FEHC Dec. No. 81-15, at 9.
228. 26 Wash. App. 195, 613 P.2d 146 (1980).
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actions did not include discrimination against couples who lived to-
gether without being married. The Commission distinguished this case
in DFEH v. Boy Scouts on the ground that unmarried cohabitation was
unlawful in Washington at the time marital status was added to its civil
rights act, while in California such cohabitation was legalized in 1975,
one year before marital status was added to the California Act.
229
New York and Michigan appear to be heading in a different direc-
tion than California in the area of no-spouse rules. In DFEH v. City of
Simi Valley,230 the Commission found that a no-spouse rule used to
deny employment constituted unlawful marital status discrimination.
But in New York and Michigan, courts have expressly stated that no-
spouse rules do not constitute marital status discrimination. For exam-
ple, in Klanseck v. Prudential Insurance Co. ,23t the defendant had a rule
that if two "district agents" married, one had to transfer to "ordinary
agent." The court held that the operative distinction was the identity
and occupation of the spouse and not his or her existence, and there-
fore there was no marital status discrimination. In Manhattan Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. New York Human Rights Appeal Board,2 32 a female em-
ployee was fired because her husband was promoted to supervisor. The
court held that she was not discharged because she was married, but
because she was married to her supervisor. This was held not to be
marital status discrimination.
In California, the Commission probably would find a prima facie
case of marital status discrimination in both of these fact situations.
The Commission would then examine the employer's affirmative de-
fenses concerning supervision, safety, security, and morale. The Fair
Employment and Housing Act specifically provides:
Nothing in this part relating to discrimination on account of marital
status shall ... affect the right of an employer to reasonably regu-
late, for reasons of supervision, safety, security, or morale, the work-
ing of spouses in the same department, divisions, or facility, consisent
with the rules and regulations adopted by the commission .... 233
The Commission's regulations state: "For business reasons of supervi-
sion, security or morale, an employer may refuse to place other spouses
in the same department, division or facility if the work involves poten-
229. DFEH v. Boy Scouts of Am., FEHC Dec. No. 81-15, at 9. See 1975 Cal. Stat. ch.
71, §§ 5-6 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269 (a)-(b) (West 1970) which made cohabitation
a misdemeanor).
230. FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 (1983).
231. 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 31,705 at 20,072 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
232. 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. 32,634 at 19,689 (N.Y. 1980).
233. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12940(a)(3) (West 1980).
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tial conflicts of interest or other hazards greater for married couples
than for other persons. '2 34 The regulations also establish an affirma-
tive defense for refusing to place one spouse under the direct supervi-
sion of another spouse.235 Since these are affarmative defenses under
the Act, the Commission has held that the respondent must prove the
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.236
While federal courts have permitted defendants to prove their
marital status discrimination defenses through broad generalizations
and speculation regarding married couples in general, 237 the Commis-
sion held in DFEH v. City of Simi Valley238 that respondents in marital
status cases cannot rest their affirmative defenses entirely on such gen-
eralizations. Rather, credible proof in the nature of admissible evi-
dence must support the defenses.239
The Commission, in City of Simi Valley, examined respondent's
defense that hiring spouses in the same department would involve po-
tential conflict of interest and other hazards greater for married couples
than for other persons. The Commission's standard of proof was high:
respondent was required to produce hard, credible evidence that the
potential conflict or hazard existed for the particular spouse involved;
that the hazard or conflict was greater than the conflict or hazard with
unmarried employees; and that, if acted upon, the hazard or conflicting
spousal interests would produce substantial harm to the employer.240
In City of Simi Valley, the Commission did not find hard credible evi-
dence that complainant's clerk-wife in a nine-person department might
falsify her husband's time sheets or breach the confidentiality of per-
sonnel files, or that, if she did so, the resulting harm would be substan-
tial enough to justify complainant's rejection.24 Further, the
234. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7292.5(a)(2) (1982).
235. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7292.5(a)(1) (1982).
236. DFEH v. City of Simi Valley, FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 at 7 (1983). See also Sterling
Transit Co. v. FEPC, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 796 (1981); DFEH v. City of Anaheim Police
Dep't, FEHC Dec. No. 82-08 at 14 (1982); DFEH v. County of Alameda, FEHC Dec. No.
81-13 at 21 (1981).
237. Espinoza v. Thomas, 580 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1978); Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978).
238. FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 (1983).
239. Id. at 8-9.
240. Id. at 7 & 10.
241. Id. at 10. Cf. Klansech v. Prudential Ins. Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 163
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (defendant tried to justify its practice of not allowing two "district agents"
to marry on the ground that the possibility of manipulation of accounts was greater for
married couple filing joint returns than non-spousal teams; ultimately, it was decided that
the no-spouse rule did not constitute marital status discrimination, and the defense was not
ruled on).
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Commission found no hard credible evidence to support the respon-
dent's belief that complainant and his spouse would either socialize ex-
cessively or fight in the work place. Therefore it found no affirmative
defense had been established.242
Seen as a whole, marital status receives special protection in Cali-
fornia. The California statute expressly covers situations excluded
from title VII and is interpreted more liberally than similar provisions
in other states. Furthermore, the defenses described in the regulations
are very narrowly drawn so as to protect potential victims of
discrimination.
Physical Handicap Discrimination in Employment
Since a large number of individuals in the work force have some
type of disability,2 43 the state legislature has proscribed handicap dis-
crimination. California's Fair Employment and Housing Act prohibits
most employers244 from discriminating against workers who have a
"physical handicap" or "medical condition." 245 When a disabled246 in-
dividual experiences employment discrimination, he or she may also
seek federal protection. Federal statutes, however, reach only a limited
group of employers and can restrict the litigants' access to the courts.
Given these jurisdictional and procedural restraints, 2 47 the state system
242. The respondent also argued that the Department had the burden and failed to
prove that complainant would have been hired into the open mechanic position if respon-
dent had not first rejected him because of his marital status. The Commission rejected this
analysis, and chose to follow the federal title VII decisions which held that after unlawful
discrimination and entitlement to relief is established, the employer has the burden of dem-
onstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that notwithstanding the discrimination an
independent non-discriminatory factor would have resulted in the rejection of complainant.
DFEH v. City of Simi Valley, FEHC Dec. No. 83-21 at 14-16 (citing Day v. Matthews, 530
F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and Rodriquez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1977)). Under
this standard, the Commission found that the respondent failed to prove it would have re-
jected complainant had it considered him.
243. "In 1976, according to data collected by the Bureau of Census . there were 16.6
million adults who reported some level of work disability. This represented 13 percent of
our population aged 18 to 64 years." S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
245. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980). While the term "physical handicap"
has been broadly interpreted, see infra note 265 & accompanying text, the statutory provi-
sion for "medical condition" has been limited to rehabilitated cancer, see supra note 25.
246. Throughout this Article, the authors often choose to use the term "disabled" rather
than the word "handicapped." While "handicap" has been used by the legislature and the
courts, this term has met with objection from members of the disabled community. See
Comment, The Rehabditadon Act of 1973: Who is Handicapped Under Federal Law, 16 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 653, 653 n.2 (1982).
247. A complete analysis of all substantive differences between federal and state laws
protecting disabled individuals is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the Article will
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often provides more effective relief for victims of disability
discrimination.
Threshold Limitations of the Federal Laws
While title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
and national origin, it does not proscribe handicap discrimination. A
separate statute, generally referred to as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
represents Congress' major attempt to prevent discrimination against
disabled individuals.248 This federal statute may reach employers re-
ceiving federal financial assistance, federal contractors, and federal
agencies. An analysis of the two provisions that are most frequently
relied upon, sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,249
shows that the federal legislation has limited application.
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which contains a
requirement for affirmative action in employment of disabled persons,
only covers the conduct of those who have government contracts or
subcontracts in excess of $2,500.250 Consequently, a substantial number
of private sector employees cannot rely on this federal statutory
provision.
Apart from these jurisdictional limitations, section 503 also
presents significant enforcement problems. Unlike California law,25'
the availability of a private right of action under section 503 is highly
focus on major jurisdictional and procedural limitations of the federal system and, in light of
the federal restrictions, address the substantive law in California.
248. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 393 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Other federal remedies for handicap dis-
crimination are available in specific situations. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1242 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (prohibiting handicap discrimination by recipients of revenue funds under the State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972); 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (requiring
federal contractors to take affirmative action with respect to disabled Vietnam veterans); 20
U.S.C. § 1405 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (requiring recipients of assistance under the Education
of the Handicapped Act to make efforts to employ disabled individuals). A third part of the
Rehabilitation Act, § 501, is limited to coverage of federal agencies and departments. 29
U.S.C. § 791(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
249. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
250. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in pertinent part:
Any contract [or subcontract] in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal de-
partment or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal
services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision
requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party con-
tracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance
in employment qualified handicapped individuals ....
Id. § 793(a) (Supp. V 1981).
251. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965 (West 1980). See supra notes 86-87 & accompanying
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questionable. The statute does not contain an explicit provision for pri-
vate suits252 and appellate courts have refused to imply such a right.2 53
Thus, enforcement of section 503 is left to the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), an agency within the Depart-
ment of Labor.25 4
An assessment of OFCCP's administrative process shows why dis-
abled individuals are hampered by a denial of a private cause of action
under section 503. First, while OFCCP has the power to investigate,
conciliate, and hold administrative hearings, 255 the major sanctions
contained in the administrative regulations involve withholding pay-
ments due on a contract or disqualifying the contractor from future
government contracts.25 6 The administrative process has yielded some
back pay awards, but studies show that the vast majority of disability
discrimination victims do not receive financial compensation. 257 Other
aspects of the OFCCP process can also be burdensome. For example,
the agency's lack of resources has led to a large backlog of administra-
tive complaints. 258
252. Enforcement provisions of the statute only give an aggrieved individual the option
to file a complaint with the Department of Labor and merely enable the Department to
"take such action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant ...." 29 U.S.C. § 793(b)
(1976). Administrative regulations promulgated to enforce the statute only state that the
"Director may, within the limitations of applicable law, seek appropriate judicial action to
enforce the contractual provisions . . . including appropriate injunctive relief." 41 C.F.R.
§ 60-741.28(b) (1982).
253. While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue,
courts of appeals have found no private right of action. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Tucson.
663 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2nd Cir. 1981):
Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
611 F.2d 1074, 1084-85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc.,
611 F.2d 134, 135 (6th Cir. 1979).
254. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 assigns enforcement of section 503 to the Depart-
ment of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See supra note 252. As a divi-
sion of the Department of Labor, the OFCCP has promulgated regulations governing
enforcement. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.1 to -.54 (1982).
255. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.1 to -.54 (1982). Under its regulations, the OFCCP must first
attempt to resolve the case by conciliation. 1d. § 60-741.28(a). If the conciliation is fruitless.
a formal hearing may be held. 1d. § 60-741.29(a). An individual, however, is not guaran-
teed this administrative hearing. The Director of the OFCCP has total discretion as to
whether the hearing will be granted. Id. § 60-741.26(g)(1).
256. Id. § 60-741.28(c)-(e).
257. See, e.g., Comment, Protecting the Handicappedfrom Employment Discrimination in
Private Sector Employment: A Critical Analysis of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 54 TUL. L. REV. 717, 742 (1980). The author states that in fiscal year 1978, OFCCP
received 2,700 complaints. Only 120 individuals making these complaints received back pay
awards. Id.
258. A previous director of OFCCP has stated that the agency had a "large backlog of
Section 503 complaints, which the Department of Labor, due to its limited resources, will
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Another federal anti-discrimination statute, section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, also has significant limitations. 25 9 Apart from its sub-
stantive difficulties, 260 this section's usefulness in the employment
not be able to investigate and resolve expeditiously." Affidavit of Weldon J. Rougeau, then
Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Department of Labor,
reprinted in Appendix to Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1108-09 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980).
Statistics confirm the delay in processing § 503 complaints. For example, in fiscal year
1980 there was a backlog of over 2,000 unresolved § 503 complaints at OFCCP. Zucker-
man, Handicappers'Rights: Section 503-4 Special Kind of Leverage, 17 TRIAL, Feb. 1981,
at 33. During that year only seven percent of the agency's staff time was devoted to com-
plaint investigation. Id.
259. Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States as defined in
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
260. Some of § 504's substantive problems are illustrated by Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), the first United States Supreme Court opinion inter-
preting that section. In Davis, a woman with a hearing impairment was denied admission to
a college nursing program. Reversing the court of appeals' finding of discrimination, the
Supreme Court's unanimous opinion placed new burdens on § 504 plaintiffs.
Section 504 contains language stating that disabled individuals must be "otherwise
qualified" in order to claim discrimination. In Davis, the question was whether physical as
well as other technical qualifications should be considered. The Supreme Court determined
that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's require-
ments in spite of his handicap." .d. at 406. Thus, the Court refused to restrict its inquiry to
only non-physical qualifications and thereby severely limited the type of individual who
could invoke § 504's protection.
The second substantive area discussed in Davis concerns the duty to accommodate dis-
abled individuals. Davis argued that the college could provide personal supervision by an
instructor during the clinical program or, in the alternative, the clinical requirement could
be waived. The Court determined, however, that section 504 did not require these modifica-
tions. It stated that "Section 504 imposes no requirement. . . to lower or to effect substan-
tial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person." Id. at 413. While
Davis did suggest that accommodations might be appropriate in some situations, id. at 412-
13, the opinion clearly serves to limit what accommodations can be expected.
The Davis language has been applied to employment discrimination cases. See, e.g.,
Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981). Some commentaries have sug-
gested ways to narrow Davis. See Note, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, Section
504, and Handicapped Rights, 16 CAL. W.L. Rav. 523 (1980); Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped" Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 171 (1980).
California authority offers a different approach. This is evidenced in the recent Com-
mission decision of DFEH v. City of Anaheim, FEHC Dec. No. 82-08 (1982). There, an
individual with multiple disabilities was denied a police dispatcher position. Rather than
require a showing that the employee was "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of Davis,
the Commission articulated a less limiting position on the burden of proof. "A prima facie
case is established if the DFEH proves by circumstantial or direct evidence that a complain-
ant was barred from employment on the basis of physical handicap." Id. at 5. Unlike in
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setting is problematic. Section 504 proscribes handicap discrimination
in "any program or activity" receiving federal funds, programs or ac-
tivities conducted by executive agencies or the United States Postal
Service.26' Thus, by definition, section 504 cannot reach many employ-
ers covered by the California statute.2 62 Moreover, a number of appel-
late courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have essentially nullified the
application of section 504 in employment cases. These courts have
concluded that section 504 does not cover employment discrimination
unless "a primary objective of the federal financial assistance is to pro-
vide employment. ' 263 This additional limitation results in little or no
protection against employment discrimination that occurs in federally
funded programs.
Davis, plaintiffs prima facie case is made upon a showing that he or she could meet the job
requirements except for limitations imposed by the disability.
After a prima facie case is established, the employer is entitled to raise affirmative de-
fenses or show a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 6. The Commission's
approach allows a litigant to more fully present his or her case and allows the Commission
to more appropriately consider the individual's qualifications in the context of the need to
accommodate.
For a fuller discussion of California's duty to accommodate, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 307-15.
261. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
263. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). The Scan-
ion majority rested their decision on reasoning found in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation
Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). Trageser ana-
lyzed a 1978 amendment to the Rehabilitation Act. That amendment afforded § 504 liti-
gants the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The Trageser court assumed that title VI
only covers situations where the "primary objective of Federal financial assistance is to pro-
vide employment," 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976), and chose to apply the same restrictive con-
struction to § 504. 590 F.2d at 88-90.
The Trageser opinion has been sharply criticized. See Scanlon v. Atascadero State
Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272-77 (9th Cir. 1982) (Ferguson, J., dissenting); see also Comment,
Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped- Can Trageser Repeal the Private Right
of Action?, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173 (1979); Note, Judicial Limitations on Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 989 (1982). Nonetheless, TrageserYs reason-
ing has been followed by a number of circuits. See United States v. Cabrini Medical Center,
639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1981). Cf. Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d
1226 (7th Cir. 1980) (reasoning of Trageser was accepted but holding did not apply because
purpose of aid was to provide employment). Two other circuits, however, have refused to
adopt the holding in Traseger. See Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Jones v. Metropolitan At-
lanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d 1376 (11 th Cir. 1982). When this Article went to press.
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court was pending in Le Strange. Thus, the Court
may soon settle the apparent split in the circuits.
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The Substantive Law in California
In light of the threshold limitations of federal law, a disabled indi-
vidual often finds that the state system provides his or her only remedy.
Even if the litigant is not totally precluded from federal relief, some
aspects of California's substantive provisions may be more desirable.
While the Fair Employment and Housing Commission has issued a
number of precedential decisions on physical handicap cases,264 there
has been a paucity of appellate case law in the area. Two recent Cali-
fornia court decisions, however, have clarified major substantive is-
sues.265 These court decisions, which primarily discuss the statutory
definition of physical handicap and defenses to the Act, provide consid-
erable guidance for the California litigant.
Definition of Physical Handicap
Despite the drawbacks of the federal system, individuals have
sought relief under the Rehabilitation Act because it contains an ex-
pansive statutory definition of the term "physical handicap. '266 More-
over, until recently, the California courts had not discussed the
dimensions of the state statutory definition, a provision that, on its face,
appeared to be more restrictive than the federal definition. In a recent
case, American National Insurance Co. v. FEHC,2 6 7 the California
Supreme Court established the scope of the state definition. The
Court's broad interpretation will undoubtedly aid a number of individ-
uals who are currently seeking relief under the State Act.
264. See supra note 77.
265. The two recent decisions are American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651
P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982), and Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice
Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981).
266. Under the Rehabilitation Act, a person is handicapped if he or she: "(i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's ma-
jor life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
While the statute is broad on its face, its application can be complex. See E. E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980), for one court's interpretation of the
federal definition. There, the court looked at four factors to determine whether an appren-
tice carpenter who was denied work because of a back problem could claim protection under
the Act. The four factors it used when deciding if the "impairment" constituted a substan-
tial handicap to employment were "(1) the number ofjobs from which the disabled individ-
ual was disqualified; (2) the types of jobs from which the disabled individual would be
disqualified; (3) the geographic area to which the individual had access; and (4) the individ-
ual's job expectations and training." id. at 1100-02. Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court to some extent has narrowed the statute's application. See supra note 260
(discussion of Southeastern Community College v. Davis).
267. 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982).
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In American National, an insurance sales and debit agent named
Dale Rivard was fired because of his elevated blood pressure.268 Mr.
Rivard sought relief under the FEHA, asserting that his discharge was
an unlawful act of physical handicap discrimination. 269 The California
Supreme Court found that high blood pressure is covered under the
statutory definition of physical handicap2 0 and additionally an-
nounced a test for determining what other types of disabilities are cov-
ered by the State Act. 271
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Newman, assessed sev-
eral statutory provisions. The court looked at Government Code sec-
tion 12940,272 a general proscription against unlawful handicap
discrimination, and additionally analyzed the more specific definitional
section of the statute, codified in Government Code section 12926(h).
The critical issue before the court was the meaning of the latter provi-
sion, which states:
"Physical handicap" includes impairment of sight, hearing, or
speech, or impairment of physical ability because of amputation or
loss of function or coordination, or any other health impairment
which requires special education or related services. 273
The court, broadly interpreting this language, found that the list of dis-
abilities in section 12926(h) is not "exhaustive" 274 and consequently set
out a standard for deciding which disabilities are covered. In order to
gain statutory protection, an individual must show "1) that the illness
268. Id. at 606, 651 P.2d at 1152-53, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 346-47. ("The work of a sales and
debit agent is to go door-to-door in a specified residential district selling insurance and col-
lecting premiums. Agents are expected to meet certain sales quotas and to be current in the
collection of premiums. The Company regards the work of a sales and debit agent as stress-
ful, and as a matter of policy does not hire persons with elevated blood pressure for that
work"). At the hearing, it was established that Mr. Rivard worked as a debit agent for a
least two years while suffering from elevated blood pressure. Letter from Deputy Attorney
General David S. Chaney to the California Supreme Court (June 14. 1982) (on file at the
Dep't of Fair Employment and Housing).
269. At the administrative level, the Commission concluded that Mr. Rivard had suf-
fered from discrimination. It ordered reinstatement with back pay. The company then un-
successfully sought a writ of review in the superior court. The court found that the
commission's findings were supported by the evidence and concluded that high blood pres-
sure is a protected physical handicap under the California Fair Employment Practices Act.
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d at 606, 651 P.2d at 1153. 186 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
After the court of appeal ruled on the issue in a depublished opinion, the case came before
the California Supreme Court.
270. Id. at 608-10, 651 P.2d at 1154-56, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 348-50.
271. Id. at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
272. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 12940 (West 1980).
273. Id. § 12926(h).
274. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 651 P.2d at 1154, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 348.
or defect is physical, and 2) that it is handicapping. '275
When determining the statutory coverage of physical handicaps,
the court noted that "Webster's [Dictionary] tells us that a handicap is
'a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult.' Obvi-
ously a condition of the body which has that disabling effect is a physi-
cal handicap. ' 276 Epilepsy, cerebral palsy, arthritis, and high blood
pressure are examples of protected disabilities.277 Also, non-major im-
pairments are covered by the Act.278 Moreover, the Act's coverage is
not limited to those who have present disabilities. An employer's per-
ception or belief that an individual may be disabled in the future is
sufficient to trigger the statute's protections. 279
The American National court did place two restrictions on Gov-
275. Id. at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
276. Id. at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Justice Newman emphasized
this point by referring to another definition found in a report of the Advisory Committee for
the International Year of Disabled Persons. Id. at 609 n.5, 651 P.2d at 1155 n.5, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 349 n.5. The report states that "handicap is a loss or limitation of opportunities to take
part in the normal life of the community on an equal level with others." Report of Advisory
Comm. for the Int'l Year of Disabled Persons (Oct. 7, 1981) U.N. Dec. No. A/36/471/ Add.
I, p. 2 (emphasis added by American National court).
277. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 349. The reference to arthritis, a condition which might not be commonly thought
of as giving rise to statutory protection, is particularly interesting. This shows the breadth of
the statute's application. Additionally, the opinion's reference to Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair
Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981) (individual
was denied employment because of a low back defect), by implication shows that back inju-
ries are also protected under the Act. See 32 Cal. 3d at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr.
at 349.
278. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 348-49.
279. Id. at 609-10, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349. A recurrent issue in physical
handicap cases has been whether individuals who are "perceived" or "regarded as" being
disabled have statutory protection, regardless of actual disability. See, e.g., DFEH v. Inter-
state Brands Corp., FEHC Dec. No. 78-05 (1979). The California Supreme Court answered
this question in American National by concluding that the Act's protection is not limited to
those who have present disabilities. It stated that the law "clearly was designed to prevent
employers from acting arbitrarily against physical conditions that, whether actually or po-
tentially handicapping, may present no current job disability or job-related health risk." 32
Cal. 3d at 610, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The court also points out the anom-
aly in granting statutory protection to those who are presently disabled while disallowing
jurisdiction over cases where an employer wrongly believes that an employee will not ade-
quately perform in the future. 1d
The inappropriateness of other actions by employers was also alluded to in the Ameri-
can National case. The court's recitation of some facts from respondent's brief suggests the
need to give employees a personal physical examination by a doctor with some specialized
knowledge of the alleged disability. The court implied that an employer may not maintain a
general policy of excluding individuals who have a certain disability. Id at 607-08, 651 P.2d
at 1153-54, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48.
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emnment Code section 12926(h). Non-physical handicaps, such as
mental or economic disabilities, are excluded from statutory protec-
tion.280 Also excluded are "ills or defects that in fact are not handicap-
ping."281 The breadth of this latter category must still be explored.
While the court listed as examples "certain kinds of digestive, respira-
tory, or skin disorders," 282 to the extent that these conditions are handi-
capping, they are arguably covered under the Act.283 Moreover, the
sweeping language adopted by the majority of the Court284 suggests
that the California statute will provide extensive coverage for disabled
employees.
Judicial Interpretation of Employers' Defenses
The scope of employers' permissible defenses under the FEHA has
also received judicial interpretation. In Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Em-
ployment Practice Commission,285 the California Court of Appeal fo-
cused on three defenses commonly raised by California employers. In
280. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal. 3d at 608, 651 P.2d at 1154, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 348. In footnote 4, Justice Newman suggests that disabled individuals who are not
covered under the Fair Employment Practices Act may seek relief under article I, § 8, of the
California Constitution. While a complete discussion of Justice Newman's footnote is be-
yond the scope of this Article, the footnote infers that the constitutional provision grants a
broad cause of action for many employment discrimination claims.
281. Id. at 608, 651 P.2d at 1154, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
282. Id
283. Relinquishing jurisdiction over all individuals who have digestive, respiratory or
skin disorders clearly seems inconsistent with the broad statutory construction contained
elsewhere in the American National opinion. Since the restriction is designed to exclude
conditions "that in fact are not handicapping," its application could be limited to temporary
conditions like the common cold.
284. In a lengthy dissent, Justice Mosk, joined by Justice Richardson, sharply criticized
the majority opinion. Justice Mosk condemns the majority's definition because "they
wrench the terms out of context and look no further than Webster's dictionary." Id. at 612,
651 P.2d at 1156, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350. According to the dissent, an "explicit definition" of
physical handicap is contained in California Government Code section 12926(h). Id. at 611,
651 P.2d at 1156, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350. While the statute states that "[pihysical handicap
includes .... " the dissent did not see these as terms of enlargement. Rather, Justice Mosk
found the term "include" was used inconsistently within the statute and thus determined
that "no inference can fairly be drawn one way or the other." Id
Justice Mosk also finds that the majority's "sweeping definition violates a number of
canons of statutory construction." Id at 612, 651 P.2d at 1157, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350. In
response, he presents a detailed analysis of the statute's language and legislative intent. Id.
at 612-15, 651 P.2d at 1157-58, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 350-52. Further, the dissent sees principles
of liberal construction and public policy as insufficient justifications for the majority's con-
clusions. id at 615, 651 P.2d at 1158, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 352. Finally, Justice Mosk exten-
sively discusses the Commission's interpretation of the statute. He charges the Commission
with essentially rewriting the statute and strongly disapproves regulations promulgated by
the Commission. Id at 615-20, 651 P.2d at 1159-62, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 352-56.
285. 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981).
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that case, employee Jose Bustamante worked for Sterling as a tempo-
rary truck driver. After doing satisfactory work for nineteen months,
Bustamante was offered the same job on a permanent basis. When a
physical exam revealed that Bustamante had scoliosis, a lower back
problem, he was discharged. The discharge was based on Sterling's
blanket policy against hiring anyone with back disabilities.
28 6
Since the company conceded that Mr. Bustamante's disability con-
stituted a handicap under the Act, 287 the scope of the statutory defini-
tion was not at issue. Rather, Sterling claimed that Mr. Bustamante's
disability was a justifiable ground for the termination of his employ-
ment. The company maintained that a healthy back is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (b.f.o.q.) for the job of truck driver.288 The
b.f.o.q. defense, if successful, justifies a refusal to employ all persons
who are members of a protected class. This can be done "without in-
quiry as to whether certain members of the class may, in fact, be capa-
ble of safe and efficient job performance. 28 9
Because the b.f.o.q. defense can dramatically affect large numbers
of individuals, federal title VII cases (albeit not in the area of physical
handicap) have chosen to limit the defense's application.290 The Ster-
ling court similarly realized how the b.f.o.q. could have "severe ramifi-
cations"291 and put forth a narrow test for the defense. Under the
California Act, an employer may not "exclude a handicapped person
286. Id. at 794, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
287. Id
288. Statutory authority for the b.f.o.q. defense is found in CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12940(a)(1) (West 1980).
289. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at
796, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
290. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). See
generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW 230-43 (1975).
As was noted in the Sterling opinion, the b.f.o.q. defense is not, by statute, available in
federal handicap cases. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 796 n.3, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 550 n.3. An analogous
federal principle is a "job relatedness" requirement. For an analysis of how both concepts
apply to disability discrimination and title VII, see Lang, Protecting the Handicapped from
Employment Discrimination: The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Doctrines, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 989 (1978). In that article, the author summarizes the differ-
ence as follows:
The notion of job-relatedness is thus distinguished from that of the BFOQ in that
the former comes into play when selection criteria that are neutral on their face
nevertheless operate to exclude members of certain groups, while the latter serves
as a justification for the overt exclusion of these groups.
Id at 990.
291. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at
797, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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on the basis of class alone, unless it is proved all, or substantially all,
persons in that class are unable to perform the job duties safely and
efficiently. ' 292 While the Sterling court noted that common carriers
may be subject to a less burdensome standard, the court did not apply
one in this case and concluded that the company had failed to establish
the b.f.o.q. defense. 293
A second justification raised by the company was the "safety" de-
fense. 294 The state Act specifically allows disability discrimination
when an employee cannot perform his or her duties in a safe man-
ner.295 "Unlike the b.f.o.q. defense, this [safety] exception must be tai-
lored to the individual characteristics of each applicant. . . in relation
292. Id. In adopting this test, the court approved the Commission's regulation which
provides, in pertinent part:
Where an employer or other covered entity has a practice which on its face ex-
cludes an entire group of individuals on a basis enumerated in the Act (e.g., all
women or all individuals with lower back defects), the employer or other covered
entity must prove that the practice is justified because all or substantially all of the
excluded individuals are unable to safely and efficiently perform the job in ques-
tion and because the essence of the business operation would otherwise be
undermined.
CAL. AOMIN. CODE tit. 2, R. 7286.7(a) (1982). As has been noted, title VII does not contain
provisions on handicap discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 6. By announc-
ing its b.f.o.q. test, however, the Sterling court also implicitly rejected the company's argu-
ment that interpretations of title VII defenses are not applicable to state handicap cases.
Compare Sterling's test with language in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228 (5th Cir. 1969). In Weeks, a sex discrimination case brought under title VII. the court
held that an employer must show "that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." Id. at 235.
293. On the common carrier issue, the court stated:
Sterling points out Weeks hypothesized an employer might sustain the burden
without showing 'all or substantially all' class members would be unable to safely
and efficiently perform the job duties by showing the impossibility or impractical-
ity of dealing with them on an individualized basis, thus allowing it to apply a
reasonable general rule. The court in Harriss v. Pan Am WorldAirways, Inc. found
such a demonstration. However, Harriss involved safety regulations designed to
safeguard passengers transported by common carrier and stressed the employer's
showing of the increased likelihood of severe harm to its passengers in the absence
of its safety policies. Further, a lesser showing is required to justify employment
discrimination by common carriers.
Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 175
Cal. Rptr. at 551 (citations omitted). The court concluded that "Sterling's evidence does not
support extending the lesser alternative standard to other than common carriers." Id
294. Id.
295. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West 1980 & Supp. 1983) provides:
Nothing in this part shall prohibit an employer from refusing or discharging a
physically handicapped employee, or subject an employer to any legal liability re-
sulting from the refusal to hire or to employ or the discharge of a physically handi-
capped employee, where the employee, because of his or her physical handicap, is
unable to perform his or her duties, or cannot perform such duties in a manner
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to specific, legitimate job requirements. ' 296 A question that has been
raised in both defenses, however, is whether an employer can speculate
concerning an employee's future inability to perform safely.297
The Sterling opinion clearly limits the b.f.o.q. defense to situations
in which "handicapped persons are unable to presently safely and effi-
ciently perform the job duties. '298 The court further found the com-
pany's "conjecture" on Mr. Bustamante's future inability to perform
his duties an insufficient basis for invoking the safety defense.299 This
position has met with approval from the California Supreme Court.3 0°
After concluding that the company's safety defense was not meri-
torious,30 ' the Sterling court examined one final contention. The com-
pany complained of potentially high costs associated with employing
disabled individuals. 30 2 This assertion, sometimes characterized as the
which would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health and safety of
others.
296. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at
798, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 551 (citations omitted).
297. The issue of whether future job performance can be considered has been discussed
in a number of Commission decisions. See, e.g., DFEH v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
FEHC Dec. No. 80-21 (1980); DFEP v. Ametek, Pac. Extrusion Div., FEHC Dec. No. 80-11
(1980); DFEH v. City of Modesto, FEHC Dec. No. 79-17 (1979); DFEH v. City of Whittier,
FEHC Dec. No. 79-15 (1979); DFEH v. Interstate Brands Corp., FEHC Dec. No. 78-05
(1979).
On this issue, the Commission has concluded: "The safety defense concerns present
danger to the individual, not speculative or future dangers. Only if there is an identifiable
and substantial immediate danger to an individual's health, due to his physical handicap
may an employer lawfully refuse to hire him." DFEH v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.,
FEHC Dec. No. 80-21 at 11 (1980).
298. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at
796, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 550 (emphasis in original). Compare the court's statement of facts
which emphasizes that Sterling had a policy "against hiring persons with back deficiencies,
even those not presentdy disabling." Id. at 794, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 549 (emphasis in original).
299. Id. at 799, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
300. In American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603,
651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982), the court characterized the defense contained in
California Government Code § 12940(a)(i) as a "present inability to perform a job effi-
ciently, safely and without danger to health." Id. at 609, 651 P.2d at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
349. Citing Sterling, the California Supreme Court found the state act protects individuals
who do not present a "current job disability or job-related health risk." Id. at 610, 651 P.2d
at 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
301. Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d at
799, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
302. The court found that:
The employer faces possible liability, each time a job injury occurs, for payment of:
(1) initial medical treatment, (2) full wages to the end of the current working day,
(3) off-time, through workers compensation, (4) a percentage of any permanent
disability, (5) rehabilitation in the event of total disabilty, and (6) expenses in-
curred in replacing the injured employee. . . .We are certain our Legislature was
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"business necessity defense," is frequently raised by employers 0 3 The
court noted that federal agencies have refused to accept high insurance
costs as a rationale for discriminatory hiring practices. 3°4 Further, the
court declined what it saw as an invitation to create a non-statutory
"financial impact exception. '30 -5 Finally, the court found that the as-
serted "undetermined future increase" in business costs could not jus-
tify a policy of excluding everyone with back irregularities.3 06
Reasonable Accomodation: An Area to be Explored
A major defense that has yet to receive judicial interpretation in-
volves the employer's duty to accommodate disabled employees. Gov-
ernment Code section 12994, as recently amended, implies such a duty.
The previous statute provided: "Nothing in this part relating to dis-
crimination in employment shall be construed to require an employer
to alter his premises to accommodate employees who have a physical
handicap or medical condition, as defined in section 12962, beyond
safety requirements applicable to other employees. ' 30 7 The amended
provision, however, heightens the employer's duty. It states: "Nothing
in this part relating to discrimination in employment shall be construed
to require an employer to make accommodation for an employee who
has a physical handicap that would produce undue hardship to the
employer." 30 8
To date, the courts have not discussed the meaning of California's
accomodation provisions. Similarly, the Commission of Fair Employ-
ment and Housing has not issued an opinion that fully explores the
extent of an employer's duty to accomodate. Several Commission deci-
sions, however, have touched on what constitutes reasonable
accomodation.
In DFEH v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BAR), 309 an em-
not unmindful of this issue when it made all exclusionary hiring practices unlawful
but those within the stated narrow exceptions specifically relating to job ability and
safety.
Id
303. The Court stated that "[t]hese substantial concerns are mirrored by employers in
every jurisdiction mandating equal employment opportunity for the handicapped." Id.
304. Id. (citing the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Program and the Health Ed-
ucation and Welfare Office for Civil Rights).
305. Id. (observing that Wisconsin, a state with similar statutory provisions, has left this
task to the legislature).
306. Id. at 800, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
307. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12994 (West 1980).
308. Id. § 12994 (West Supp. 1983).
309. FEHC Dec. No. 80-21 (1980).
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ployee's prior back surgery was the basis for denying him a utility
worker position. When discussing BART's duty to accommodate the
complainant's disability, the Commission set out the following stan-
dard: "Even had the evidence been found to establish that Pittson was
unable to do the full range of duties of a utility worker, our inquiry
would not be at an end. Under the interpretation of FEPA's prohibi-
tion of physical handicap we have adopted, we would still have to de-
cide whether, with reasonable accommodation, Pittson could perform
the essential functions of the job. If so, unless BART could show that
the accommodation imposed an undue hardship, the district would still
be liable for unlawful discrimination on the basis of physical
handicap." 310
The duty to accommodate was also discussed in DFEH v. Southern
Pac c Transportation Co. 3 11 There, the Commission focused on the
essential purpose of the job. Complainant Mr. Katzer was prohibited
from working as a railroad engineer because he experienced "synco-
pes," a type of blackout. The Department asserted that Mr. Katzer
should have been given a "fireman" position. Concluding that this was
an unreasonable accommodation, the Commission stated:
In any event, the accommodation requested by the Department, that
Katzer should have been give a fireman's position, encounters factual
difficulties. Southern Pacific's "firemen" are in actuality student en-
gineers or engineer trainees who assist the engineer and on occasion
operate the locomotive. Although a syncope on a fireman's part
would be less likely to result in extreme harm to health or safety
(because the fireman is less likely to be operating the locomotive), the
essence of the position is to prepare individuals to work as engineers.
The accommodation requested by the Department would require
Southern Pacific to alter the essential purpose of the "fireman's"
position. 312
The most recent Commission decision in this area is DFEH v. City
ofAnaheim Police Department.3 13 The Anaheim case, which involved a
person with multiple disabilities, illustrates how the concept of essential
310. Id. at 11 (citations omitted). After setting out this standard, the Commission found
that BART had not introduced any evidence that established undue hardship. Id. at 12.
The Commission determined that BART could give Mr. Pittson light-duty job assignments.
Id. at 7, 11-12.
The BART case came before the Commission a second time, on a petition for reconsid-
eration. Id. at la-8a. The Commission's Order on Reconsideration confirmed the existence
of an employer's duty to accomodate, id. at 4a-5a, and reaffirmed the viability of modifying
the job in question, id. at 5a-6a.
311. FEHC Dec. No. 80-33 (1980).
312. Id. at 3.
313. FEHC Dec. No. 82-08 (1982).
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job functions can be applied. In Anaheim, an individual with paralysis
of the upper left arm, a fused hip, a colostomy, and a hearing disability
was denied employment as a police dispatcher. The Commission de-
termined that some of the disabilities could be accommodated while
others could not. Thus, while employee Walker's inability to use both
hands meant that he could not change a teletype roll, the testimony of a
Lieutenant Molina established "that anyone at the counter could load
the teletype and that Mr. Walker could be easily accommodated in this
regard. '314 In contrast, there was no duty to accommodate Mr.
Walker's hearing disability. The paramount requirement for a dis-
patcher position is "normal to acute hearing." The Commission con-
cluded that a hearing aid could not help Mr. Walker and found
unacceptable the alternative of having another dispatcher repeat the
broadcasts that Mr. Walker could not hear. On the latter proposed ac-
commodation, the Commission stated:
Anaheim has no legal duty to restructure its dispatcher positions so
as to have the secondary act as backup to the primary beyond that
which is presently the case; that is not the purpose of reasonable ac-
commodation. Rather, reasonable accommodation must enable the
handicapped person to perform the essential job functions, not sup-
plant the need for the handicapped person.315
Reasonable accommodation is a concept that plays an integral role
in many employment discrimination cases. While the full dimensions
of an employer's duty to accomodate are unclear, the Commission's
opinions represent a step towards defining that duty. Certainly this is-
sue will receive attention in the future. California litigants, therefore,
have room to develop meaningful approaches to this area of the law.
California: A Desirable Forum
While there are still a number of issues that have not been re-
solved by the courts, recent California case law clearly mandates relief
for a significant number of disabled individuals who are confronted
with employment discrimination. The California judiciary's expansive
interpretation of what constitutes a physical handicap and its sensible
articulation of defenses to the Act serve as a useful tool for these liti-
gants. Because federal statutory provisions exclude many employees
from jurisdictional protection and make enforcement procedures prob-
lematic, California may well be the arena where a majority of physical
handicap claims are litigated in the future.
314. Id. at 7.
315. Id. at 11. For the United States Supreme Court's approach to accommodation, see
supra note 260.
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Conclusion
Although the analytical frameworks for California's FEHA and
the federal civil rights laws are comparable, statutory differences make
the California statute substantially less restrictive and procedurally
more accessible to potential plaintiffs. When a person complains of
employment discrimination based on physical handicap or marital sta-
tus, or presents a comparable worth claim, he or she often will find
much greater substantive protection under state law. And when a com-
plainant seeks administrative resolution of a discrimination charge, the
vastly broader enforcement powers of the California administrative
agencies provide a much more effective source of administrative
redress.

